Redemption

"...politics should not try to be redemptive. But that is not because there is another sort of redemption available, the sort that Catholics believe is found in the Church. It is because redemption was a bad idea in the first place. Human beings need to be made happier, but they do not need to be redeemed, for they are not degraded beings, not immaterial souls imprisoned in material bodies, not innocent souls corrupted by original sin. They are, as Nietzsche put it, clever animals, clever because they, unlike the other animals, have learned how to cooperate with one another in order better to fulfill one another’s desires. In the course of history, we clever animals have acquired new desires, and we have become quite different from our animal ancestors. For our cleverness has not only enabled us to adjust means to ends, it has enabled us to imagine new ends, to dream up new ideals. Nietzsche, when he described the effects of the coolingoff of the sun, wrote: “And so the clever animals had to die.” He would have done better to have written: “And so the brave, imaginative, idealistic, self-improving animals had to die.” The notion of redemption presupposes a distinction between the lower, mortal, animal parts of the soul, and the higher, spiritual, immortal part. Redemption is what would occur when the higher finally triumphs over the lower, when reason conquers passion, or when grace defeats sin. In much of the onto-theological tradition, the lower-higher distinction is construed as a distinction between the part that is content with finitude and the part that yearns for the infinite."

"An Ethics for Today: Finding Common Ground Between Philosophy and Religion" by Richard Rorty: https://a.co/eRonvvd

The only moral obligation

"Is the Church right that there is such a thing as the structure of human existence, which can serve as a moral reference point? Or, do we human beings have no moral obligations except helping one another satisfy our desires, thus achieving the greatest possible amount of happiness? I agree with John Stuart Mill, the great utilitarian philosopher, that that is the only moral obligation we have. The Church, of course, holds that views such as Mill’s reduce human beings to the level of animals. But philosophers like me think that utilitarianism exalts us by offering us a challenging moral ideal. Utilitarianism leads to heroic and self-sacrificing efforts on behalf of social justice. Such efforts are entirely compatible with the claim that there is no such thing as the structure of human existence. The Spanish philosopher George Santayana once said that superstition is the confusion of an ideal with power. Superstition, he said is the belief that any legitimate ideal must somehow be grounded in something already actual, something transcendent that sets this ideal before us. What the pope calls the structure of human existence is an example of such a transcendent entity. Santayana said, and I agree, that the only source of moral ideals is the human imagination. Santayana hoped that human beings would eventually give up the idea that moral ideals must be grounded in something larger than ourselves. He hoped that we would come to think of all such ideals as human creations and none the worse for that. Santayana’s claim that imagination is a good enough source for the ideal led him to say that religion and poetry are identical in essence. He used the term “poetry” in an expansive sense to mean something like “product of the imagination.” He used the word “religion” in an equally large sense to include political idealism, aspirations to make the life of a community radically different, radically better than it had been before. Poetry, Santayana said, is called religion when it intervenes in life, and religion when it merely supervenes upon life is seen to be nothing but poetry. Neither poetry nor religion, Santayana believed, should be thought of as telling us about something that is already real. We should stop asking about the claims made on us by an ideal, nor should we ask about the nature of our obligation to live up to the ideal. To give oneself over to a moral ideal is like giving oneself over to another human being. When we fall in love with another person, we do not ask about the source or the nature of our obligation to cherish that person’s welfare. It is equally pointless to do so when we have fallen in love with an ideal. Most of Western philosophy is, like Christian theology, an attempt to get in touch with something larger than ourselves. So to accept Santayana’s view, as I do, is to repudiate the tradition that Heidegger called ontotheology. That repudiation means ceasing to ask both metaphysical questions about the ground or the source of our ideals and epistemological questions about how one can be certain that one has chosen the correct ideal."

"An Ethics for Today: Finding Common Ground Between Philosophy and Religion" by Richard Rorty..: https://a.co/0yxfx9t

Rorty obit

From The New York Times: Richard Rorty, Philosopher, Dies at 75

Mr. Rorty’s inventive work on philosophy, politics, literary theory and more made him one of the world’s most influential contemporary thinkers.

Richard Rorty, whose inventive work on philosophy, politics, literary theory and more made him one of the world’s most influential contemporary thinkers, died Friday in Palo Alto, Calif. He was 75.

The cause was complications from pancreatic cancer, said his wife, Mary Varney Rorty.

Raised in a home where “The Case for Leon Trotsky” was viewed with the same reverence as the Bible might be elsewhere, Mr. Rorty pondered the nature of reality as well as its everyday struggles. “At 12, I knew that the point of being human was to spend one’s life fighting social injustice,” he wrote in an autobiographical sketch.

Russell A. Berman, the chairman of the Department of Comparative Literature at Stanford University, who worked with Mr. Rorty for more than a decade, said, “He rescued philosophy from its analytic constraints” and returned it “to core concerns of how we as a people, a country and humanity live in a political community.”

Mr. Rorty’s enormous body of work, which ranged from academic tomes to magazine and newspaper articles, provoked fervent praise, hostility and confusion. But no matter what even his severest critics thought of it, they could not ignore it. When his 1979 book “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature” came out, it upended conventional views about the very purpose and goals of philosophy. The widespread notion that the philosopher’s primary duty was to figure out what we can and cannot know was poppycock, Mr. Rorty argued. Human beings should focus on what they do to cope with daily life and not on what they discover by theorizing...

https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/11/obituaries/11rorty.html?smid=em-share

“All deities reside in the human breast"

"Rorty concludes by holding out the hope that pragmatism, like romanticism, might yet serve as a means for holding out hope—hope that we might someday come to realize that we and we alone are responsible for dreaming up new and more humane ways to live:

If pragmatism is of any importance—if there is any difference between pragmatism and Platonism that might eventually make a difference to practice—it is not because it got something right that Platonism got wrong. It is because accepting a pragmatist outlook would change the cultural ambience for the better. It would complete the process of secularization by letting us think of the desire for non-linguistic access to the real as as hopeless as that for redemption through a beatific vision. Taking this extra step toward acknowledging our finitude would give a new resonance to Blake’s dictum that “All deities reside in the human breast.”

Philosophy as Poetry (Page-Barbour Lectures)" by Richard Rorty, intro by  Michael Bérubé https://a.co/iKgeGSf

"One starts with ethics"

"Perhaps there are people who embark on the study of philosophy because they are worried about whether the external world really exists, or whether they can tell the difference between dreaming and being awake, or whether it is OK to argue in syllogisms, but I have never met any. Although one can, once one gets started, become thoroughly engrossed in any of these problems, one never starts with them. One starts with ethics; that is, one starts with the realization that not everyone has the same values as oneself and the hope that one will find some way to justify one’s own values. This realization may occur in the toils of an actual moral dilemma, or in finding that a friend cannot see any point in a novel you admire, or in any other of an almost infinite variety of ways. Whatever there is in us that makes us want to fit every part of our experience together with every other part makes us also try to fit our values, our goals, our attitudes toward other people, into some larger scheme. The attempt to do this – to justify theses values and goals and attitudes is, I think, what starts people studying philosophy."

"On Philosophy and Philosophers: Unpublished Papers, 1960–2000" by Richard Rorty: https://a.co/33Yvv0n

On Philosophy and Philosophers: Unpublished papers, 1960-2000 by Richard Rorty | Issue 147 | Philosophy Now

...Rorty's verdicts are not always convincing, but are always worth serious reflection. Consider a pair of typically inviting opening sentences:

From 'What is Dead in Plato':

"It is quite true that the history of philosophy is a series of footnotes on Plato, but in the last few centuries, many of these footnotes have been saying, 'Notice how much harm this particular bad Platonic idea has done'."

From 'The Paradox of Definition':

"One way of describing what happened when, in the Renaissance, philosophy deserted Aristotle and became 'modern' is to say that their notions of the location of indefiniteness changed."

Some of Rorty's best discussion of his own philosophical position, pragmatism (following the pragmatism of Dewey and Sellars), comes in the final selection, 'Remarks on Nishida and Nishitani' (1999). Rorty acknowledges his 'extremely superficial' knowledge of the Buddhist traditions and literatures that form the background for their thought, but he offers a constructive suggestion in which he describes pragmatism as "an emphatic reaction against Hegel, against absolute idealism, and against metaphysics" (p.241), inspired by Darwin's theory of evolution. He contrasts this with Nishida's and Nishitani's 'enthusiastic' endorsement of a version of absolute idealism. He also cites Josiah Royce as the American philosopher whose view is closest to Nishida.

The Rorty who emerges from these essays is an ardent but not doctrinaire pragmatist and naturalist who warns about the political dangers inherent in the idealist and anti-naturalist positions while also seeing the risks of a headlong rush by philosophers into accepting Locke's vision of the philosopher as a follower, not a leader – a mere "under-labourer, removing some of the Rubbish" in the wake of "the incomparable Mr Newton." This volume sets a timely example of how a politically engaged philosopher can put hard won expertise to valuable use.

© Prof. Daniel C. Dennett 2021

Daniel Dennett is University Professor at Tufts, Co-Director of the Center for Cognitive Studies, and author, most recently of From Bacteria To Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds (2017).

• On Philosophy and Philosophers: Unpublished Papers, 1960-2000, Richard Rorty, ed by W.P Malecki and Chris Voparil, CUP, 2020, £17.99 pb, 260 pages.

https://philosophynow.org/issues/147/On_Philosophy_and_Philosophers_Unpublished_papers_1960-2000_by_Richard_Rorty

"Should philosophy retire?"

(Or just some philosophers?)

Richard Rorty (1931–2007) was the philosopher's anti-philosopher. His professional credentials were impeccable: an influential anthology (The Linguistic Turn, 1967); a game-changing book (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1979); another, only slightly less original book (Consequences of Pragmatism, 1982); a best-selling (for a philosopher) collection of literary/philosophical/political lectures and essays (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 1989); four volumes of Collected Papers from the venerable Cambridge University Press; president of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association (1979). He seemed to be speaking at every humanities conference in the 1980s and 1990s, about postmodernism, critical theory, deconstruction, and the past, present, and future (if any) of philosophy.

All the same, it began to be whispered among his colleagues that in mid-career Rorty had become disillusioned with being a philosopher and turned into something else: a culture critic, an untethered public intellectual, a French fellow traveler. And the chief whisperer, it turned out, was Rorty himself. After leaving Princeton's philosophy department in 1981, he never held another appointment as a philosopher—by choice. He thought philosophy's days were numbered and spent the second half of his career (and much of the first) explaining why.

But how can philosophy end? Surely the quest for Truth is eternal? Surely the hunger for Wisdom is part of human nature? Surely questions about the Good will never cease to exercise us? Well, yes and no. Certainly Rorty was not proposing that we simply give up on all the big questions. We will always mull over "how things, in the largest sense of that word, hang together, in the largest sense of that word," a phrase he quoted often from one of his favorite philosophers, Wilfrid Sellars. But he thought that philosophy's perennial abstractions, distinctions, and problems—including Truth, human nature, and the Good—though they were once very much alive, had by now led Western thought into a dead end and should be retired...

https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/should-philosophy-retire

Pragmatism’s Evolution: Organism and Environment in American Philosophy

While it is widely acknowledged that pragmatist philosophy originated within an intellectual climate profoundly shaped by evolutionary theory and its initial reception in the United States, the details of this cultural environment and of its influence upon the early pragmatists have tended to receive less attention than they merit. Trevor Pearce's impressive and well-researched study addresses this gap in the literature on early pragmatism, but it is also intended to appeal to historians and philosophers of biology, given its focus upon the various debates to which evolutionary theory gave rise in late Nineteenth and early twentieth century America, not only between supporters and rivals of evolution, but also amongst champions of different schools of evolutionism. Pearce understands the pragmatist tradition in a broad sense, in terms of relations within and between 'cohorts' of scholars, not all of whom are customarily acknowledged as 'pragmatists' in standard histories of the movement, notwithstanding their overlapping historical experiences, academic environments and cultural climates. Focussing throughout upon their cultural context and the details of their interventions in an on-going debate which he traces from the 1860s to the first decade of the twentieth century, Pearce is primarily concerned to situate the pragmatists within their lively intellectual environment, rather than to reconstruct and elucidate their doctrines and arguments in less explicitly historical terms. As such, Pearce does not seek to specify any particular doctrinal content to which one must subscribe in order to qualify as an authentic pragmatist... (continues)

Trevor Pearce, Pragmatism's Evolution: Organism and Environment in American Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, 2020, 365pp., $35.00 (pbk), ISBN 9780226719917.

Reviewed by Daniel Herbert, University of Sheffield

How Self-Reliant Were Emerson & Thoreau

Transcendentalism, the American philosophy that championed the individual, emerged from an exceptionally tight-knit community.

 ...a new vision of Thoreau has taken shape. He is the townsman who turned his withdrawal into a conspicuously individual performance—"his well-built house" by Walden Pond "readily visible to passersby on the carriage road"—in order to take his neighbors and family along on his journey. Thoreau and his family were ardent abolitionists (his sister Helen was a friend of Frederick Douglass's), and he continued to hide enslaved people on their flight to Canada even while living at the pond.

The famous early chapters of Walden—which seem so brutally insulting toward greedy, wasteful, acquisitive farmers and townsfolk—turn out to have been delivered, face-to-face, as lectures to his neighbors in the Concord Lyceum in 1847, by a self-revealing Thoreau under the title "History of Himself." Such chastisement was in the old New England spirit of calls to the congregation. "Thoreau never sloughed off the heritage of Ezra Ripley and the message of community," Gross writes. "In his mind he was never alone. The community came with him." 

Atlantic 

Tadd Ruetenik

 Tadd Ruetenik is Professor of Philosophy at St. Ambrose University. He is the author of The Demons of William James: Religious Pragmatism Explores Unusual Mental States (2018) and Secretary of the William James Society.  

What does American philosophy mean to you?  

Since the term “American” signifies continents, “American philosophy” does not signifies more than “United States philosophy.” I take it to refer to philosophy related to life in the Western Hemisphere, and in contrast especially to Europe.  

I do not see a particular need to assert that American philosophy is strongly tied to  pragmatism. In fact, I have come to see that term “pragmatism” as problematic, since in almost all popular usage it means either an unscrupulous power play on  the world, or some kind of compromise that favors non-populist centrist politics. I  know that many philosophy terms have common usages that differ or even work  against the word in its philosophical sense—“idealism” and “metaphysics,” for  example—but I am having difficulty motivating myself for the battle of meanings. I  have been drawn to the term “pluralism,” or better, “radical pluralism” to describe  the philosophy in this part of the globe. If it wasn’t so occult-sounding, I’d suggest  “transcendental pluralism” which can refer to the problem of “the one and the many” that William James, perhaps presciently, said was the fundamental problem  of philosophy. But then we would still begin to run into troubles with the common  usages of the word. Perhaps I’ll be able to retire at that point.  

How did you become an American philosopher?  

Since an early age I have had a personal antipathy for nationalism, patriotism, and any types of large, political allegiance, especially as this relates to the United States. My early interests were in existentialism and philosophy of religion, and it does puzzle me a bit why I became interested in American philosophy to begin with. After a world religions course at a community college piqued my interest in philosophy, I enrolled at Eastern Michigan  University. The counselor had recommended I take just 4 courses, but I was a somewhat  older student, and thought I was ready for more, so I picked up the phone—it was the  beginning of touch-tone registration back in the early 1990s—and I added the first  philosophy class I could find. This happened to be American Philosophy, and was taught by a great professor for whom this was not in her area of specialization. There was something of a radical and environmentalist take to the class, but I remember being  especially drawn to Emerson and Thoreau... (continues)

Rorty

	Michael S Roth ⁦‪@mroth78‬⁩ My take on Dick Rorty: "Pragmatists can only point out that we depend on one another & thus should develop narratives that will encourage us to listen to one another in order to find more inclusive solutions to the problems that plague us" ⁦‪@LAReviewofBooks‬⁩ lareviewofbooks.org/article/we-can…   10/27/21, 10:48 AM

"[W]e do not, if I am right, need a theory of rationality, we do need a narrative of maturation." He is committed to the anti-authoritarian Enlightenment project of replacing obedience to the Divine (whether in the shape of a deity or a monarch) with obedience only to "a law one gives oneself," as Rousseau and Kant had it. We may arrive at an agreement about the laws we give ourselves — we don't discover the One True Law. Pragmatism is anti-authoritarian because it rejects the notion that we need something nonhuman (God, Reality, Truth) for our salvation.

Back to Chocorua

  

 

Phil Oliver

0 seconds ago

Thanks for taking me back to Mt. Chocorua, I was there in 2010 for a conference marking the centenary of philosopher William James's death (and of course celebrating his life). James's summer home was there, he loved the mountain and environs and rode the train up from Cambridge as often as he could. His home, he said, had fourteen doors "all opening out"... An old realty listing: https://www.movoto.com/chocorua-nh/1434-chocorua-mt-hwy-chocorua-nh-03817-890_4504819/

Read more


Trout and Coffee
161K subscribers

==

WJ's "thinking places"

A pleasing confidence (from 2015)

One of the wisest things young William James ever said, before age thirty and not long after hurdling the crisis of confidence that had him "about touch[ing] bottom" in his diary and contemplating suicide:

It is a pleasing confidence that... by working our stint day by day on the one line we have chosen, without looking ahead or thinking much of the final result, we are sure of waking some fine morning, experts in our particular branch, with a tact, so to speak for truth therein: a judgment, and ideas and intuitions of our own - all there without our knowing exactly how they came. (April 8, 1871, cited in Robert Richardson's bio)

Put in the hours and days, and the years and career will take care of themselves. Lay down the right habits of work and routine, and eventually you may expect to soar like those skimming Amazon gulls. Or at least you'll figure a few things out, maybe even publish a book or a few. As Annie Dillard said (and as Maria Popova never tires of repeating), how we spend our days is how we spend our lives. A step at a time.

Notice, James didn't claim to know this. It's a "pleasing confidence," an article of faith, a repository of hope, a bootstrap to pull up on. It worked for him.

Where was James's Thinking Place? In Cambridge, MA, there was Emerson Hall where he taught his classes.



There was his longtime home at 95 Irving St.

 

And there was the half-mile between them that he trod daily.

His favorite Thinking Place was surely in Chocorua, N.H., to which he escaped when classes ended each summer, and where he sat on a wall and chided his Cambridge colleague, metaphysical rival, and neighbor Josiah Royce. "Damn the Absolute!" (I sat on that wall myself, in 2010.)

And his favorite spot in Chocorua had to be the mountain across the road. 

Followed him there, too, a step at a time. Confidence rewarded.
==
Postscript-

Where the Great Man Lived by Bob Bradford A Report on the William James Memorial 100th Anniversary Symposium, Chocorua Village, August 13-15, 2010 When William James, Harvard‟s pre-eminent and iconoclastic 19th-century pioneering psychologist, philosopher, and scholar of religion, was dying in the summer of 1910, one of his last heart-felt desires was to return to his beloved family summer residence, “Stonewall,” up on Heavenly Hill in New Hampshire‟s then-remote and still bucolic Chocorua valley. Upon arrival, he exclaimed, “It‟s so good to be home!” So, how fitting it is, in this Granite state whose motto reads “Live Free or Die,” that a 100th anniversary to commemorate the death of this philosophical giant of Free Will thinking was organized last August. This was an extraordinary four-day conference-symposium, convened and coordinated by dynamic William James Society‟s president and university professor, Paul Croce, and co-sponsored by the Chocorua Community Association, spearheaded by tireless Rev. Kent Schneider of the Chocorua Community Church. A final day of the conference concluded back in Cambridge at Harvard University‟s Houghton Library and James‟s home stomping grounds around and about the Crimson‟s campus. This long weekend symposium, charging a $100 registration fee, was titled “In The Footsteps of William James,” and designed to honor James‟s spirit for some 130 international academics, Jamesian scholars, college students, and also just plain interested philosophy neophytes, congregating in little Chocorua village from locations as far away as Oxford University, Moscow, Bologna, and Tokyo. The whole idea was to become immersed in Jamesiana, exploring places where James lived, and attending a diverse range of lecture presentations, seminars, interactive workshops, casual Socratic discussions, all with the hope of reflecting on James‟s ability to encounter experience afresh and approach problems creatively. People also were provided ample opportunity to explore the philosopher‟s natural settings, hear folk singing and cornet band performances of period music, listen to storytellers recounting James-related anecdotes, canoe and swim in his stillpristine nearby lake, and even hike up the very mountain trails that had inspired and played such an essential role in formulating a Jamesian intellectual ethos. “The intention was for this to be a public event that could bring academics and regular citizens together to hear about William James‟s life and theories, and evaluate continuing uses of his ideas for our time,” explains conference coordinator Professor Paul Croce, speaking from his Stetson University American Studies offices down in Florida. “To me, two of James‟s most important teachings for today is, first, his deep commitment to liberal arts education as a key essential to democracy---in other words providing a mental map of learning as a key to good citizenship. Secondly, he had a simply remarkable mediating mind that presents key ways to cope with extreme polarizations in our society, including truly listening to others and grasping different points of view. “Bottom line is he was an incredibly wise dude,” Croce emphasizes, “and whatever he‟s singing about, we‟d do well to listen up, today.” Croce adds enthusiastically that, according to just about everyone who attended the symposium, Chocorua did indeed live up to highest expectations as “the perfect place” for this conference. “What we were trying to achieve with this was to let James‟s thinking resonate out to communities at large, well beyond academic circles. And here everyone found a locale with great charm, unpretentious warm and accommodating places for lodging and meals like the Lazy Dog, Riverbend Inn, Gilman Tavern, Whittier House, everything so welcoming and friendly. There was also a true appeal for both mind and body throughout the whole weekend, as well. It‟s exactly the way James himself would have wanted it. I can‟t tell you how many people were just raving about the whole laid-back informality of it all, how persuasive it all was, how refreshing and lovely the entire community experience.” Agrees Harvard Magazine associate editor-feature writer, Craig Lambert, who journeyed up from Cambridge for the weekend, “Academic conferences are too often confined to airless rooms where participants engage the subject at hand on a purely intellectual, cerebral basis. William James was not that kind of scholar, and this was in no way that kind of an encounter. “We were able to enjoy the lake and the mountains that meant so much to him, and get a feel for the village where he passed so many happy summer months, and even, thanks to the current owners, to tour the inside of his dwelling, as well as his barn and surrounding property. We listened to James music, stories, saw galleries of historic photographs and memorabilia from the James era. What I came away with was a much more rounded sense of who William James was, not only as a philosopher and psychologist, but as a man.” Internationally celebrated Harvard astrophysicist-turned-teacher of philosophy, Robert Doyle, echoes Lambert‟s thought. Doyle was one of the showcase speakers up for the symposium, championing James theories about Free Will and changeable destiny vs. the staunch beliefs in hide-bound determinism, where everything in life is already scripted and never subject to chance. “It was the location factor for this conference that had the greatest impact on my psyche,” Doyle says. “I‟m an historically oriented thinker, and I can‟t tell you the number of philosophers I‟ve studied going back before Aristotle, and studied them in 12 different languages” he observes. “So, visiting this intimate home site venue has provided me a profound new James connection. “In the spirit of hermeneutics, I guess you could call me a „hermenaut,‟” he goes on, with a dry chuckle. A what, we ask? Doyle laughs and explains this is a kind of word-play he coined on the space exploration astronaut idea, “only my hermenaut is an explorer who‟s traveling backwards in time to literally put himself back into the environment of a given philosopher. You‟ve almost got to put on those same shoes the thinker was wearing to understand his work. “So, in this case, here was William James in the later 19th century,” Doyle continues, “when determinism was the order of the day, everything in God‟s hands, neatly programmed, pre-ordained, so very Victorian. But this great man was able to break free from all that. Somehow, he had the independence of mind and courage to break away. He was the first, if not the only, philosopher of his era  to do so.” Consider the grasp of this phenomenal achievement. And here we are in Chocorua, the very dead-center of where so much of this unprecedented, ground-breaking, independent philosophic freedom of thought was really created, Doyle emphasizes. Maybe it was a brain storm that occurred while swimming on his back, floating free, suspended and weightless, gazing up at that ruggedly independent, majestic granite peak, as Doyle himself had just done this morning. Maybe major inspirations took shape while gazing at these White Mountain silhouettes of the whole Sandwich range during a long, lingering, glorious Chocorua sunset, like the spectacular free-form, ever-changing color show Doyle had witnessed just last night. “Who knows exactly what all the inspirations were?” Doyle muses aloud. “But being here and experiencing James‟s Chocorua firsthand has been indescribably exciting for a hermenaut like me.”
- http://web.mit.edu/~slanou/www/shared_documents/CLA_Fall_2010_Newsletter.pdf
==
Post-postscript. Not quite the way it was originally...

     

slideshow, 1434 Chocorua Mt Hwy...
http://www.movoto.com/chocorua-nh/1434-chocorua-mt-hwy-chocorua-nh-03817-890_4504819/for-sale/

Originally published 6.26.15 (DS)

LISTEN