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Sunday, October 8, 2023

The Varieties of Religious Experience - Lectures 1 & 2

The Varieties of Religious Experience Lectures 1 & 2

Lecture 1- Religion and Neurology

-This lecture is a psychological inquiry aimed at real lived religious behaviors by two means, analyzing ‘what are the real propensities?’ and ‘what is their philosophical significance?’. It is common that religious explanations have come from empirical reality initially and we now hold existential critiques of factors missed. Meanings of our critics were not logically answered then rather they moreso utilized a spiritual judgment such as trusting in the Bible, and if we are able to combine such spiritual judgments with prior existential critiques, we get some revelation value in our realizations. Existentialism alone is bad at determining values. But for James’s venture we must analyze religion rather existentially but with some religious flavor added. As for some people religion is exceptional and ecstatic and for others it is conventional and something they follow by habit thus rather a second hand lived religious experience. Also, we must account prior historical geniuses in the religious line. Many expressed highly genuine and phenomenal experiences but of course this is tough to measure. When we analyze religion as existential, we must acknowledge these pathological aspects as also being a part of humans and not just religion. When an object is first perceived the first aim is declassify it, but to some of us objects offer great importance and devotion thus making it ‘sui generis’, or unique to itself (p9), and is better left at that, ie., we would fight our own classification as we find ourselves to be unique. The next aim may be to inquire causal origins, in this James utilizes Spinoza, in that human desires relate with causation just as objects and lines do. A common religious causation point of view is that the causes of low origin disrupt those of higher spirituality and this conception usually is forced on the sentimental find those less sentimental, ie., a high emotional temperament may mean high reverence, but a bad digestion may mean universal instability. These rough causations also project back to critics as well; many aim to reduce religion to sexuality or religious reverence to mere pleasure. It is common for people to discredit minds, we do it to others but fight it upon us as we believe our own mental states to have substantial value for lived truths (p13). Medical materialism may help, that being a psychological experience from the mind that affects the body. This helps to legitimize many religious experiences like the genuinity of reality shared by many religious geniuses such as the founder of the Quaker religion; it also helps to show the relation between distress and organs. Medical materialism completely changes the perception of such people as at least being a true and genuine experience that they had. Religion must also begin considering organic processes, such as with the use of science to observe for an individual's religious conviction that their blood pressure may rise. However, if we do take religion organically it certainly argues a spiritual superiority in that science could never determine revelation as that all depends on and comes from the individual perceivers body. In making use of spiritual judgment, it disregards and fights others discrediting states commonly reorganizing their own conceptual realities, ie., something now disliked relates to a disliked organ. Even if not religious, it's common for us to want to assume superior minds to exist. Individuals’ relativity and experiences make it hard to compare, rather, it is an internal judgment of personal happiness that labels X as good. But certainly, the most good isn't the most true, a drunk experience may hold some good but only for so long. But afterwards they may continue to follow the internal voices remembered from the experience. Now, it would be good turning back to the pathological realities involved, we have the empirical argument that a genius is a hereditary degeneration, such a positive trait in social culture that one would never consider it addressing their work concerning pathological influences. Then should we disregard geniuses? No, our academic spiritual needs prevent us. No one refutes arguments based on the authors neurotic psyche rather, we accept it. This should be the same with religion and should be much more inclined to accept them as much of their religious values derive from immediate spiritual experiences. This immediate experience being roughly comprised by philosophical reasonableness and moral helpfulness, such that the universal instability relates to one's bad gut health. But concerning the causes and their origins, it has always been a philosophical dream and quest as well as religions. Medical materialism is useful here as it removes the question of origin and rather concerns itself with how X works on the whole, our empirical criterion. In studying, such as Christian mysticism, there has always been a problem with legitimacy concerning experiences and visions shared and we should use the empirical criterion to analyze “by their fruits…not by their roots” (p20). With Saint Teresa, the more imperfect sleep the more unhealthy thus the more imperfect imagination the less healthy the soul (p21). James suggests judging religion by results so he says we should look at exaggerated extremes of a pathological regard for better religious analysis. Many pathological realities involve negative consequences but also at many times combined with people of superior intellect who greatly impact their contemporaries. Regarding pathological realities, to one brain they respond to ‘what should I do next?’ And for another they respond to ‘what must I do next?’. Now we should look at religious phenomena things such as melancholy and religious evolution, happiness from religious beliefs, and trances that bring religious truths. Whether religious or not they still gain each trait, such as happiness or melancholy. Now that we have disregarded causal origins we are only concerned about the practicality of experiences. It would also be helpful to see the true religious divide in such examples like religious melancholy versus moral melancholy, but with our mass of worldly phenomena religious examples must be utilized in comparison.

Lecture 2- Circumscription of the Topic

-You cannot identify religion by a single essence, it is better to leave it as a collective name. It is common that dogmatism tends to oversimplify and try to identify a single unifier but instead we can see it has many overlapping traits, similar to asking one to define a government. Now, concerning things like religious love or reverence, they most likely relate with an intended object. Thus, it is not merely an object with religious value, but it invokes emotional responses by the individual that they define as divine. Rather than a common essence to religious emotions it is better to view us as having a storehouse of emotions which objects can draw from (p28). In this lecture. James aims to narrow a definition for religion to work with and first in defining we must separate institution from personal. For a religious institution one’s practices and efforts are for the deity and thus their external reality, for personal religion one participates for themselves and thus their internal reality. For James institutional is diluted through officials and thus becomes secondary. Personal religion is a more primary and primordial direct connection with the divine thus James will only regard the personal religion for this lecture. Now we reach a narrowed definition for religion: the feelings, acts, and experiences within an individual solitude regarding what they apprehend as the divine (p31) and, interacting with it either morally, physically, or ritually. Defining the divine is rather open as well as commonly we see past humans such as the Buddha revered to the same degree as a God, or there is also Emersonian religion with the divine as translated into a moral universal order, as if it were a God, either way one could trust it the same. It is rather ridiculous to try to regard such inner experiences as not being religious. Much of religion relates with a deep and primal nature and this is sure to crossover with humans’ attitude towards life and the world, as that being their total reaction. Questions like: ‘what is the character of the universe we live in?’ (p35), define individuality. So, why not consider them religious? But surely some find it difficult to consider something religious for everyday attitudes. James shares a good Voltaire example, that in the face of war he thanks God, gives a laugh, and calls life of farce, as something not to take serious (p36). This totalizing of the universe with regards to his emotional reaction is his total reaction to the universe. As the universe is found ‘not to be taken too serious’ that necessitates the prior reality of serious to the mental conception; however, religion defines it always carries a ‘serious state of mind’, religion favors reality over personal individual flavor. At times of joy, they fight Snickers and at times of sorrow they fight screams (p38), these being some good examples of religious solemn experiences. Thus, narrowing religions definition even more to the divine as not only the primarily real but also as the primarily real one “feels impelled to respond to solemnly” (p38) by their own choice. Does it make a difference to call this religious or not? Well, those that do operate so with some vibrant religious energy or a very wholesome mood. Surely in distinguishing these two, personal religion must have elements to it that morality does not. If so, how do we separate them? A common phrase for both is ‘accept the universe’, ok but is this done wholesomely or grudgingly? Do we accept it as if forced into submission? For the religious, they accept it positively as a necessity with enthusiasm. Thus, making a massive practical difference to reality with the religious one as an active participant. But we are still aiming to find particular essences solely found within religious experiences. In prior comparison of the religious and the moralist we saw the division of philosophy from religion. A stoic, moral, or philosophical life is less swayed by attention to means rather than objective ends, ‘the good side of war’, that calls for volunteers (p45). If one is sick, and they cannot fight in war, they certainly can fight in moral warfare. They could train against personal indifferences for a possible better future, hold silence for life's tragedies, trust in ethics, and so much more, all by their own choice. Where the moralist practically lacks, religion flourishes; where things work out, morality works, but when things do not there is certainly decay and morality struggles. We all struggle with existential dreads and certainly crave universal security but many times at our most dreadful last resorts volunteerism arises, substituting well-being where there is not. By one's choice they may substitute mental pursuits and worldly actions for their reverence and trust in God as their personal dreads become a realm of safety. In morality fear is held, in this case it is “positively expunged and washed away” (p47). Religion helps add a degree of enchantment to life by means of extension of the reality of a subjective reach for things like emotion, power, freedom, etc. By religions solemn nature for many it would be ridiculous to reduce it to happiness. In religions consent to evil, it no longer uses happiness as an escapism. For them, utilizing higher elements helps keep lower ones in check thus, a world is richer with a devil than not but just as long as we have a good footing. Truly a religious only essence is here, nowhere else does one grow happier by feeding on negativity. Religion truly helps to ease the necessities in life with a solemn regard.

--Seth Graves-Huffman

6 comments:

  1. We read VRE last spring in "Experience and Rationality"... Here's how we began: https://rationalitymt.blogspot.com/2023/01/questions-jan-24.html

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    1. [James's "Varieties of Religious Experience," based on his Gifford Lectures, inspired Carl Sagan's widow Ann Druyan to publish her husband's 1985 Gifford Lectures under the title "Varieties of Scientific Experience"...]

      We commence this evening, in our MALA course, our reflective survey of the varieties of experience.

      It's William James's Varieties of Religious Experience in the first segment of our weekly three-hour session, and then Carl Sagan's Varieties of Scientific Experience after the intermission. Carl collaborated in work with life-partner Ann Druyan, whose idea it was to issue his 1985 Gifford Lectures ("The Search for Who We Are") under a title that pays direct homage to WJ's from the turn of the previous century.

      So it's only right, I say, that we should also read and discuss her Cosmos: Possible Worlds, companion book to the latest video sequel to her and Carl's 1980 Cosmos. We should take a moment in class to appreciate the passing of the cosmic baton from Carl to Neil deGrasse Tyson.

      Possibility, I said in my introduction, is much of what "experience" means to me. Same goes for all three of our authors. William said "the really vital question for us all is, What is this world going to be? What is life eventually to make of itself? As the late James scholar John McDermott points out, the philosophy and psychology of possibility is central to our vital response.

      Carl said it's possible that, if we manage to survive our technological adolescence, we'll expand the human abode beyond this Earth-"the only home we've ever known." Ann says that vision of a bright and soaring human future, and of a truly cosmopolitan human citizenry at home whevever our dreams and ingenuity can take us, was firmly planted in her late husband when he first got a glimpse of the "world of tomorrow" at the 1939 World's Fair.

      None of our dreams, and none of the wondrous possible experiences they might engender, can be realized by humans who do not take their own experience seriously. That's WJ's message in the first chapter "Religion and Neurology," where he resists the "medical materialism" of those who dismantle dreams and visions of wondrous possible experience by reducing them to their organic antecedents.

      "Medical materialism seems indeed a good appellation for the too simple-minded system of thought which we are considering. Medical materialism finishes up Saint Paul by calling his vision on the road to Damascus a discharging lesion of the occipital cortex, he being an epileptic. It snuffs out Saint Teresa as an hysteric, Saint Francis of Assisi as an hereditary degenerate. George Fox's discontent with the shams of his age, and his pining for spiritual veracity, it treats as a symptom of a disordered colon. Carlyle's organ-tones of misery it accounts for by a gastro-duodenal catarrh. All such mental over-tensions, it says, are, when you come to the bottom of the matter, mere affairs of diathesis (auto-intoxications most probably), due to the perverted action of various glands which physiology will yet discover.

      And medical materialism then thinks that the spiritual authority of all such personages is successfully undermined."

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    2. Sagan's first chapter, "Nature and Wonder: A Reconnaissance of Heaven," begins to reclaim the possibility of a wondrous and expansive human future by affirming the fitness of our organic nature to generate appropriately cosmic dreams and visions.

      Druyan elaborates the affinity between James and Sagan that inspired her to yoke their Gifford lectures with a mirrored title. For both, in their different ways, the respectively religious and scientific experiences of home are profoundly spiritual. Her prologue begins with Carl's romantic feeling for science, and observes that his "pale blue dot is a silent rebuke to the fundamentalist, the nationalist, the militarist, the pollluter--to anyone who does not put above all other things the protection of our little planet and the life that it sustains in the vast cold darkness."

      And it is a summons to "a global spiritual awakening...to that soaring experience of the oneness of being fully alive" that she and he consider "a complete experience of nature."

      Her first chapter, "Ladder to the Stars," reminds us of the staggering scale of immensity by which we are situated in space and time. She recalls Carl's Cosmic Calendar, according to which "our tiny world coalesce[d] out of the disk of gas and dust surrounding our star" on August 31, and we arrived four "months" later in just the last ticking moments of the cosmic "year"-remarkable!

      No less remarkable is the fact that the very consciousness with which we comprehend that scale of immensity, "starstuff pondering the stars" that we are, is due to a genetic mutation on a miniscule single rung of the DNA ladder that is in fact the eponymous double-helix ladder to the stars in question. Tweak thirteen atoms differently and we'd not be pondering anything at all.

      We'd presumably not be entertaining dreams and visions of personal or species-level possible futures and worlds. Our experience would probably not be complex and varied, our questions would go not much beyond what's for dinner. We'd not be taking up a class on Experience.

      Aren't we lucky!

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  2. "Existentialism alone is bad at determining values." -- Are you thinking of the passages in which WJ juxtaposes "existential judgment" to "spiritual judgment"? Be careful not to conflate that with the later 20th century 'ism of Sartre, de Beauvoir, Camus, et al, which does NOT distinguish existential from spiritual matters (though depending on which Existentialists we're talking about, they may not consistently mean something religious by "spiritual"...

    "pathological aspects as also being a part of humans and not just religion"--right, but WJ does seem to think that original (non-habitual) religious figures tend to be exceptionally pathological--but it's not clear if he means by that a particular criticism, at least in the context of these lectures. He thinks the extreme cases are more illustrative of the heart of religion. My Methodist friend takes issue with that.

    "the causes of low origin disrupt those of higher spirituality"--WJ is challenging the reductive claim that spirituality is NOTHING BUT "low origin" rooted in bodily disruptions...

    "Medical materialism may help"--WJ thinks it may help us understand why some reductionists don't value religious experience. But of course he's against medical materialism as over-simplifying the complexity and interiority of personal experience. He's here to "defend experience against philosophy" in this sense (and not just philosophy, though the metaphysical idealists and non-radical empiricists are always much on his mind).

    "the most good isn't the most true, a drunk experience may hold some good but only for so long"--so it's not the most good after all... but contrast with the statement in Pragmatism that truth is "the good in the way of belief," and that "what it is better for us to believe is very like a definition of truth"...

    "our academic spiritual needs"--not an oxymoron?

    "No one refutes arguments based on the authors neurotic psyche"--well, some may. But we generally think it's ad hominem or a genetic fallacy to take that approach, and WJ is suggesting we're inconsistent in not applying the same standard to religious testimony.

    "Medical materialism is useful here"--again, I think you mean the repudiation of med mat'sm.

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  3. "for personal religion one participates for themselves and thus their internal reality"--but of course one's personal religion may entail belief in an external deity, and some religious institutions are less god-centered, but WJ's seeming presumption is that institutions are more about doctrine and creed than about individual experience (and it's the latter he proposes to defend)...

    "religion favors reality over personal individual flavor"--Does it? I suppose that's one of the biggest points of contention between religious and non-religious people.

    ‘accept the universe’--This can be resignation or resolve: accept what you can't change vs. accept the challenge of trying to change what you can... I tend to think of religious monists as being the former, but with the proviso that some are joyous in resignation ("He's got the whole world in his hands" etc.) and others are intentionally disengaged from our world and looking for redemption in another. The former find happiness in religion, the latter have renounced happiness as irrelevant in this life. WJ's view as I understand it, when he stands neutrally in the "corridor<," is that these are all varieties of belief on a large spectrum, and any that possess practical value for particular lives are worthy (to that extent) to be defended. But to him personally, "life feels like a fight" and not (yet) a surrender, and he's HAPPY to enlist.

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  4. Re: "lowly origin" (& just before the link to sex), "discrediting states of mind for which we have antipathy" by reducing them to "nothing but"...
    "Alfred believes in immortality so strongly because his temperament is so emotional. Fanny's extraordinary conscientiousness is merely a matter of over-instigated nerves. William's melancholy about the universe is due to bad digestion—probably his liver is torpid. Eliza's delight in her church is a symptom of her hysterical constitution. Peter would be less troubled about his soul if he would take more exercise in the open air, etc."

    Everything has an organic correlate:
    "Scientific theories are organically conditioned just as much as religious emotions are; and if we only knew the facts intimately enough, we should doubtless see “the liver” determining the dicta of the sturdy atheist as decisively as it does those of the Methodist under conviction anxious about his soul. When it alters in one way the blood that percolates it, we get the methodist, when in another way, we get the atheist form of mind. So of all our raptures and our drynesses, our longings and pantings, our questions and beliefs. They are equally organically founded, be they of religious or of non-religious content."

    "When we think certain states of mind superior to others, is it ever because of what we know concerning their organic antecedents? No! it is always for two entirely different reasons. It is either because we take an immediate delight in them; or else it is because we believe them to bring us good consequential fruits for life."

    "Opinions [in science] are invariably tested by logic and by experiment, no matter what may be their author's neurological type. It should be no otherwise with religious opinions."

    "If there were such a thing as inspiration from a higher realm, it might well be that the neurotic temperament would furnish the chief condition of the requisite receptivity." Higher realms, higher powers: can we naturalize these concepts, for WJ? Must higher mean supernatural?

    "when in our definition of religion we speak of the individual's relation to “what he considers the divine,” we must interpret the term “divine” very broadly, as denoting any object that is godlike, whether it be a concrete deity or not." A god is whatever we "worship," "revere," prioritize, defer to... In our culture today, consumerism seems to be that to many of us.

    "Religion, whatever it is, is a man's total reaction upon life, so why not say that any total reaction upon life is a religion?"

    Renan: “In utrumque paratus, then. Be ready for anything—that perhaps is wisdom. Give ourselves up, according to the hour, to confidence, to skepticism, to optimism, to irony, and we may be sure that at certain moments at least we shall be with the truth.... Good-humor is a philosophic state of mind; it seems to say to Nature that we take her no more seriously than she takes us. I maintain that one should always talk of philosophy with a smile." Does WJ entirely disapprove?

    Interesting and ironic, in view of how Fuller met her end: “I accept the universe” is reported to have been a favorite utterance of our New England transcendentalist, Margaret Fuller; and when some one repeated this phrase to Thomas Carlyle, his sardonic comment is said to have been: “Gad! she'd better!”

    A happy solemnity? Many of us find the animal variety more delightful. "This sort of happiness in the absolute and everlasting is what we find nowhere but in religion. It is parted off from all mere animal happiness, all mere enjoyment of the present, by that element of solemnity"...

    "For when all is said and done, we are in the end absolutely dependent on the universe"... And as Carl Sagan said, "our loyalties are to the cosmos, ancient and vast, from which we sprang."

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Cosmic spirit, down to earth

This is what WJ meant by philosophy resuming its rights with respect to "the earth of things"… Kieran Fox wrote this in his spare ...