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Sunday, October 1, 2023

Pragmatism VIII

Pragmatism Lecture VIII – Pragmatism and Religion

As pragmatism will not reject anything with practical use to life, universal conceptions must be accounted for, as a use is a meaning. We must also remember, since our ancestors people have always argued the universal conceptions of the absolute by empirical means. Now James wants to start this last section with a poem by Walt Whitman titled ‘To You’, of which is much better read rather than summarized. James argues this can be taken either monistic or plural. Monistically, as a mystical piece it concerns cosmic emotions; a sentiment that ‘wherever you are you're safe’ and this is certainly pragmatically respected. But pragmatism tends more plural and ‘the you’ could have many more meanings relative to how the individual identifies; the you could be, you're better possibilities phenomenologically taken, the redemptive powers of failures, or even your loyalty to other possibilities, just to start. Next James shares an example of a friend that is willing to endure their children's suffering and even worse if they can rationalize their problems as supplemented by other worldly phenomenon and once doing this they can use it to operate in the world. James surely finds flaws in their stance but that it is a rather heartwarming expression of personal faith with a pragmatic and ameliorated intent; our concern is with pragmatism's notion of the world's possibilities. Rationalism intellectually invokes the conception of unity as the reason for the world's many facts and emotionally it uses unity as a reducer of possibilities. Thus, all good is certain and all evil is impossible and rather a means for the greater good, nearly ditching the classification of evil entirely. Now drawing a religious distinction between those who take the world as ‘must and shall be' saved and those as it ‘may be’ saved and this becomes a clash merely of validating possibilities. So pragmatic wise, what's the possibility? If we call something possible, what difference does it make? Well, if I choose to call it possible, I at least have rationalizations and contradictions to why someone argues it not possible or also another take on possibility meaning where there is a least a lack of an interference making something surely ‘not impossible’. However, we certainly prefer more concrete grounded possibilities. Logically if the correct conditions are present and without interfering conditions then something is possible. But also, if, X, a cat is possible it necessitates realities such as kittens, litter, etc. The more we find the more empirically grounded the possibility is, now becoming a fact. Now apply this to salvation pragmatically; thus at least some of the conditions for salvation do exist and the more we notice the less transparent are the preventing conditions thus concretely grounding possibilities as new facts. It is impossible for a person to be impartial here, surely, we all want to reduce universal insecurities, some people find salvation inevitable but of course others find it impossible. James aims in between the two to treat salvation as a possibility and not as a necessity or impossibility. We all favor certain conceptions and when life's complementary conditions combine then ideals become facts. These conditions act as a platform for us to act upon. So, do our acts create worldly salvation? James offers a fair point - why not? Our actions grow us and thus become our most intimate relations with life so, why overcomplicate this and not take salvation as the commonsense regard it presents itself? Actions become experiences of growth that we catch facts in the making. Surely, they have prior influences for being but not as a general whole other than typical growth. It is in parts that actions have a chance to arise, and it is the being that extends from that which grows in a location. Regardless of the vast number of factors, the only reason anything is ever to come is that someone wishes (or rather, wills) it should be here, something becomes demanded for relief. But, by wishes an individual must acknowledge others as well and thus also plurality and locational development of being and action. The wish function is as simple as things like if you want to get water then turn on the sink, if one needs some help then call someone, generally past wishing we do not need to do much more as the world is rationally organized enough to do the rest. James now addresses a thought experiment, if one met with creator prior to existence and is offered it as a worldly chance for experience without a guarantee of being saved, would you take this up? Or reject it as not safe enough? Certainly, we all have a sort of healthy minded notion that the universe would fit exactly as is and would accept this offer, and certainly others may not accept as the lack of safety removes the appeal. Surely, we all have breakdowns in life and would love the position as a ‘prodigal son’ to fall back in the embrace of the absolute of the universe. So, the security of never being born v possibilities never experienced. James argues that those seeking Nirvana, the cessation of life, are merely afraid of life. Thus, the religious monists embrace life as being necessary, one, and well. Now, turning back to the contrast of absolute appeal of the tender minded and the pluralistic appeal of the tough minded; the toughs pluralistic could even just be called moralistic and not religious, but in either use James argues it is hard to not keep some seriousness composed in life and the reality in either, as religious or moralistic, is still decided in our faith rather than logic as we have to enjoy life's adventures, experiences, and the facts that arise. Going back, those that accepted the creators offer do not avoid evil but rather face it as something to be overcome they do this by dropping it altogether and forgetting it from their universal conception. Thus, in becoming a rationalist to a universe to take it seriously is a true pragmatist by living with the undetermined. But what else must they account for? Other people, sure. Other gods? Certainly, they could just be manifestations of the true monotheistic God. So, factors can be sorted into truths. Pragmatically speaking and with the broad use, if the term God works for things, then it is truth. Differences to this are to be dealt with as they arise, continuing the truth process. James argues we as humans are not the greatest experience of reality in the universe and see us on relations with the rest of the universe and its other creatures, of which share many intentions that we interweave with social realities. With the proofs of religious experience discussed here we certainly would agree that to a vast number of creatures of varying intentions and needs there are certainly the realities of higher powers constantly operating within the world. So, one can call pragmatism religious but only as pluralistic or melioristic, but to then accept it is relative to the individual to decide. Our various overhanging beliefs plus our adventures are all that is necessary for proof of facts formed. In one's own adventuring if they are radically tough then nature itself should suffice, if radically tender then a more monistic religious approach would help better than a pluralistic but as many of us often fall in between the two then the pluralistic/moralistic option is pragmatically best. Between crude naturalism and the transcendental absolutism lies the pragmatism, or the meliorism, of religion.

Thoughts: Concerning the Walt Whitman poem; this piece feels conceivably true on a commonsense regard but truly to try a critical view on it would just be an injustice as we clearly know this is not well argued empirically. Thus, we cannot cross commonsense and the empirical and must accept this poem for the commonsense truths that arise. Thus, even just a poem like this is one's own mystical journey. James makes it clear with this, for mysticism, what some points of departure are. The more we recognize the more we can acknowledge and the more mystical our lives can be to our own desire. This is only so much clearer by his argument of actions and wishes. To the poem, it can also be viewed in a mystical lens or also a psychological lens, either work at least as a folk psychology of reputable results. Thus, some may say they have an inner monologue they converse with, and others may call it a soul and partake on a subjective adventure of a reality relative to that present headspace.

-I was a big fan of the conception of supplementing phenomenon and to me it highlighted the possible practical values of religious behavior. Say a person works out for anger, takes walks for fun, and has sex for sexual relief; the first two they could do a variety of other things to arguably meet the same release for either anger or fun, but the physical body is necessary for sexual relief. However, if prayer, for example, could substitute sexual desires truly by the individual standards and in good faith then that is remarkable the practical value in religious behaviors. Truth in sex satisfied in prayer is a true reality as much as the gym satisfies anger for Bob.

-If X is possible, it necessitates realities if a chicken is real there must be eggs, hens, food, etc.; the more we find, the more empirically grounded it is and becomes a fact. I mean, concerning all these lectures James aim has been similar in establishing the reality of pragmatism by pointing out pragmatism’s necessary realities. Surely if we believe in simple categorical conception that also necessitates religious reality. By seeing X number of events hold religious value in people's lived experience they establish the connections to make the possible a continuously adapting fact.

-So, the security of never being born v the possibilities of experiences. I found this a great thought tool; getting older I've really begun to wrestle with the former but without inquiry deeper I was only miserable wrestling with it and I find it essential, if relativity allows, to think it through. In doing so I found both components necessitate each other and are connected. If I think through my full list of thoughts within these systems I find value in the totality of the connection and truth not only in the bad but also the good. I find life better as a light wave than a particle and I cannot look at these great conceptions of life in freeze frame. They must be lived and lived with momentum, it is ok to slow the momentum it is just about the balance.

-I highly agree that within certain spheres of reality we need to ditch the conception of evil in its entirety. A decent example is when viewing animals in nature.

-I also certainly find religion pragmatically valid and James's take on all of this rather life changing, not only for myself but my perceptual lens of the social world that I live in with others.

--Seth Graves-Huffman

7 comments:

  1. "one can call pragmatism religious but only as pluralistic or melioristic"

    -- And as such, it seems to me, it can inspire real devotion and the release of our melioristic energies. Monistic religions as WJ conceives them are not melioristic, they're quietistic and confident that our devotion (our "fiat") is not required as an addition to God's. A religion of pragmatic meliorism, on the other hand, implies a god (lower-case) incapable of achieving ultimate unity and cosmic justice in the absence of a devout human contribution. And that's what I see as a difference, in tone at least, between Section V of MPML and Lecture VIII of Pragmatism. (But the "wishing cap world" and its presumption that every desire deserves prior consideration is an important point of consistency between them.) Looking forward to hearing Ed's thoughts on this.

    Whitman's poem "not well argued empirically"--right, it's not argued at all. Poems rarely are. But WJ's point seems clear: taken monistically it's consolatory, taken pragmatically/pluralisticallyt it's aspirational and hopeful. It might inspire a meliorist to action, whereas the monist might be consoled in inaction.

    "the physical body is necessary for sexual relief"--but the mind has been called our most erogenous zone...

    "Truth in sex satisfied in prayer"--hmmm...

    "Surely if we believe in simple categorical conception that also necessitates religious reality." Not following you here.

    "I find life better as a light wave than a particle"--but it's both, right? Even metaphorically?

    "and I cannot look at these great conceptions of life in freeze frame."--Nor can WJ. Concepts are freeze-frames, and have their use. But real life is in motion, it's perceptual and active.

    "within certain spheres of reality we need to ditch the conception of evil"-- but not in general, WJ says he "can't blink the evil out of sight" and must imagine it the meliorist's great foe.

    "I also certainly find religion pragmatically valid"--as irreligion can be, and the pragmatic/pluralist/meliorist "religion"... and this, again, is why Section V of MPML gives me some pause. WJ seems to tilt there to religion as the greater energizing force, but in Pragmatism he emphasizes the ways in which a monistic religious may deplete our melioristic energies. So again I look forward to Ed's thoughts...

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    1. *a monistic religious attitude

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    2. Some of my favorite passages in VIII:

      "...the pluralistic way of interpreting [Whitman's] poem. The you so glorified, to which the hymn is sung, may mean your better possibilities phenomenally taken, or the specific redemptive effects even of your failures, upon yourself or others. It may mean your loyalty to the possibilities of others whom you admire and love so, that you are willing to accept your own poor life, for it is that glory's partner. You can at least appreciate, applaud, furnish the audience, of so brave a total world. Forget the low in yourself, then, think only of the high. Identify your life therewith..."

      "Obviously here [WJ's correspondent] faces forward into the particulars of experience, which he interprets in a pluralistic-melioristic way.
      But he believes himself to face backward. He speaks of what he calls the rational UNITY of things, when all the while he really means their possible empirical UNIFICATION. He supposes at the same time that the pragmatist, because he criticizes rationalism's abstract One, is cut off from the consolation of believing in the saving possibilities of the concrete many. He fails in short to distinguish between taking the world's perfection as a necessary principle, and taking it only as a possible terminus ad quem."

      "the great religious difference lies between the men who insist that the world MUST AND SHALL BE, and those who are contented with believing that the world MAY BE, saved. The whole clash of rationalistic and empiricist religion is thus over the validity of possibility."

      "there are unhappy men who think the salvation of the world impossible. Theirs is the doctrine known as pessimism.
      Optimism in turn would be the doctrine that thinks the world's salvation inevitable.
      Midway between the two there stands what may be called the doctrine of meliorism, tho it has hitherto figured less as a doctrine than as an attitude in human affairs. Optimism has always been the regnant DOCTRINE in european philosophy. Pessimism was only recently introduced by Schopenhauer and counts few systematic defenders as yet. Meliorism treats salvation as neither inevitable nor impossible. It treats it as a possibility, which becomes more and more of a probability the more numerous the actual conditions of salvation become.
      It is clear that pragmatism must incline towards meliorism..."

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    3. The world "is a real adventure, with real danger, yet it may win through. It is a social scheme of co-operative work genuinely to be done. Will you join the procession? Will you trust yourself and trust the other agents enough to face the risk?"

      "when men are reduced to their last sick extremity absolutism is the only saving scheme. Pluralistic moralism simply makes their teeth chatter, it refrigerates the very heart within their breast."

      "a genuine pragmatist... is willing to live on a scheme of uncertified possibilities which he trusts; willing to pay with his own person, if need be, for the realization of the ideals which he frames.
      What now actually ARE the other forces which he trusts to co-operate with him, in a universe of such a type? They are at least his fellow men, in the stage of being which our actual universe has reached... monotheism itself, so far as it was religious and not a scheme of class-room instruction for the metaphysicians, has always viewed God as but one helper, primus inter pares, in the midst of all the shapers of the great world's fate."

      "we stand in much the same relation to the whole of the universe as our canine and feline pets do to the whole of human life. They inhabit our drawing-rooms and libraries. They take part in scenes of whose significance they have no inkling. They are merely tangent to curves of history the beginnings and ends and forms of which pass wholly beyond their ken. So we are tangents to the wider life of things..."

      "if you are neither tough nor tender in an extreme and radical sense, but mixed as most of us are, it may seem to you that the type of pluralistic and moralistic religion that I have offered is as good a religious synthesis as you are likely to find."

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    4. Some of my favorite MPML passages:

      "Take any demand, however slight, which any creature, however weak, may make. Ought it not, for its own sole sake, to be satisfied? If not, prove why not. The only possible kind of proof you could adduce would be the exhibition of another creature who should make a demand that ran the other way. The only possible reason there can be why any phenomenon ought to exist is that such a phenomenon actually is desired."

      "we can say that 'the universe' requires, exacts, or makes obligatory such or such an action... But it is better not to talk about the universe in this personified way, unless we believe in a universal or divine consciousness which actually exists. If there be such a consciousness, then its demands carry the most of obligation simply because they are the greatest in amount. But it is even then not abstractly right that we should respect them..."

      "Were all other things, gods and men and starry heavens, blotted out from this universe, and were there left but one rock with two loving souls upon it, that rock would have as thoroughly moral a constitution as any possible world which the eternities and immensities could harbor. It would be a tragic constitution, because the rock's inhabitants would die. But while they lived, there would be real good things and real bad things in the universe; there would be obligations, claims, and expectations; obediences, refusals, and disappointments; compunctions and longings for harmony to come again, and inward peace of conscience when it was restored; there would, in short, be a moral life, whose active energy would have no limit but the intensity of interest in each other with which the hero and heroine might be endowed.
      We, on this terrestrial globe, so far as the visible facts go, are just like the inhabitants of such a rock. Whether a God exist, or whether no God exist, in yon blue heaven above us bent, we form at any rate an ethical republic here below. And the first reflection which this leads to is that ethics have as genuine and real a foothold in a universe where the highest consciousness is human, as in a universe where there is a God as well. 'The religion of humanity' affords a basis for ethics as well as theism does."

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    5. "if we are true philosophers we must throw our own spontaneous ideals, even the dearest, impartially in with that total mass of ideals which are fairly to be judged."

      "following the will of God [is] unascertainable and vague... The best, on the whole, of these marks and measures of goodness seems to be the capacity to bring happiness. But in order not to break down fatally, this test must be taken to cover innumerable acts and impulses that never aim at happiness; so that, after all, in seeking for a universal principle we inevitably are carried onward to the most universal principle,—that the essence of good is simply to satisfy demand. The demand may be for anything under the sun."

      "our environment encourages us not to be philosophers but partisans. The philosopher, however, cannot, so long as he clings to his own ideal of objectivity, rule out any ideal from being heard. He is confident, and rightly confident, that the simple taking counsel of his own intuitive preferences would be certain to end in a mutilation of the fulness of the truth."

      "ethical science is just like physical science, and instead of being deducible all at once from abstract principles, must simply bide its time, and be ready to revise its conclusions from day to day."

      "it would be folly quite as great, in most of us, to strike out independently and to aim at originality in ethics as in physics. Every now and then, however, some one is born with the right to be original, and his revolutionary thought or action may bear prosperous fruit... no philosophy of ethics is possible in the old-fashioned absolute sense of the term. Everywhere the ethical philosopher must wait on facts. The thinkers who create the ideals come he knows not whence, their sensibilities are evolved he knows not how; and the question as to which of two conflicting ideals will give the best universe then and there, can be answered by him only through the aid of the experience of other men."

      "There is but one unconditional commandment, which is that we should seek incessantly, with fear and trembling, so to vote and to act as to bring about the very largest total universe of good which we can see."

      "books upon ethics, therefore, so far as they truly touch the moral life, must more and more ally themselves with a literature which is confessedly tentative and suggestive rather than dogmatic,—I mean with novels and dramas of the deeper sort, with sermons, with books on statecraft and philanthropy and social and economical reform. Treated in this way ethical treatises may be voluminous and luminous as well; but they never can be final..."

      "The ethical philosopher, therefore, whenever he ventures to say which course of action is the best, is on no essentially different level from the common man... when this challenge comes to us, it is simply our total character and personal genius that are on trial; and if we invoke any so-called philosophy, our choice and use of that also are but revelations of our personal aptitude or incapacity for moral life. From this unsparing practical ordeal no professor's lectures and no array of books can save us."

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    6. My LEAST favorite [because, when WJ typically invokes a god it's a less-than-omniscient/omnipotent "divine thinker" who is presumptively NOT well-suited to rank and unify all our ideals... but here, the divine thinker seems to have been elevated and exalted to that status. And as for "men of the future," he elsewhere says their destiny is "our most vital question"--and I'm inclined to agree.]:

      "Many of us, indeed,—like Sir James Stephen in those eloquent 'Essays by a Barrister,'—would openly laugh at the very idea of the strenuous mood being awakened in us by those claims of remote posterity which constitute the last appeal of the religion of humanity. We do not love these men of the future keenly enough; and we love them perhaps the less the more we hear of their evolutionized perfection, their high average longevity and education, their freedom from war and crime, their relative immunity from pain and zymotic disease, and all their other negative superiorities. This is all too finite, we say; we see too well the vacuum beyond. It lacks the note of infinitude and mystery, and may all be dealt with in the don't-care mood. No need of agonizing ourselves or making others agonize for these good creatures just at present."

      "the stable and systematic moral universe for which the ethical philosopher asks is fully possible only in a world where there is a divine thinker with all-enveloping demands... his claims would be the most appealing; his ideal universe would be the most inclusive realizable whole... we, as would-be philosophers, must postulate a divine thinker, and pray for the victory of the religious cause."

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Cosmic spirit, down to earth

This is what WJ meant by philosophy resuming its rights with respect to "the earth of things"… Kieran Fox wrote this in his spare ...