Pragmatism VIII

Pragmatism Lecture VIII – Pragmatism and Religion

As pragmatism will not reject anything with practical use to life, universal conceptions must be accounted for, as a use is a meaning. We must also remember, since our ancestors people have always argued the universal conceptions of the absolute by empirical means. Now James wants to start this last section with a poem by Walt Whitman titled ‘To You’, of which is much better read rather than summarized. James argues this can be taken either monistic or plural. Monistically, as a mystical piece it concerns cosmic emotions; a sentiment that ‘wherever you are you're safe’ and this is certainly pragmatically respected. But pragmatism tends more plural and ‘the you’ could have many more meanings relative to how the individual identifies; the you could be, you're better possibilities phenomenologically taken, the redemptive powers of failures, or even your loyalty to other possibilities, just to start. Next James shares an example of a friend that is willing to endure their children's suffering and even worse if they can rationalize their problems as supplemented by other worldly phenomenon and once doing this they can use it to operate in the world. James surely finds flaws in their stance but that it is a rather heartwarming expression of personal faith with a pragmatic and ameliorated intent; our concern is with pragmatism's notion of the world's possibilities. Rationalism intellectually invokes the conception of unity as the reason for the world's many facts and emotionally it uses unity as a reducer of possibilities. Thus, all good is certain and all evil is impossible and rather a means for the greater good, nearly ditching the classification of evil entirely. Now drawing a religious distinction between those who take the world as ‘must and shall be' saved and those as it ‘may be’ saved and this becomes a clash merely of validating possibilities. So pragmatic wise, what's the possibility? If we call something possible, what difference does it make? Well, if I choose to call it possible, I at least have rationalizations and contradictions to why someone argues it not possible or also another take on possibility meaning where there is a least a lack of an interference making something surely ‘not impossible’. However, we certainly prefer more concrete grounded possibilities. Logically if the correct conditions are present and without interfering conditions then something is possible. But also, if, X, a cat is possible it necessitates realities such as kittens, litter, etc. The more we find the more empirically grounded the possibility is, now becoming a fact. Now apply this to salvation pragmatically; thus at least some of the conditions for salvation do exist and the more we notice the less transparent are the preventing conditions thus concretely grounding possibilities as new facts. It is impossible for a person to be impartial here, surely, we all want to reduce universal insecurities, some people find salvation inevitable but of course others find it impossible. James aims in between the two to treat salvation as a possibility and not as a necessity or impossibility. We all favor certain conceptions and when life's complementary conditions combine then ideals become facts. These conditions act as a platform for us to act upon. So, do our acts create worldly salvation? James offers a fair point - why not? Our actions grow us and thus become our most intimate relations with life so, why overcomplicate this and not take salvation as the commonsense regard it presents itself? Actions become experiences of growth that we catch facts in the making. Surely, they have prior influences for being but not as a general whole other than typical growth. It is in parts that actions have a chance to arise, and it is the being that extends from that which grows in a location. Regardless of the vast number of factors, the only reason anything is ever to come is that someone wishes (or rather, wills) it should be here, something becomes demanded for relief. But, by wishes an individual must acknowledge others as well and thus also plurality and locational development of being and action. The wish function is as simple as things like if you want to get water then turn on the sink, if one needs some help then call someone, generally past wishing we do not need to do much more as the world is rationally organized enough to do the rest. James now addresses a thought experiment, if one met with creator prior to existence and is offered it as a worldly chance for experience without a guarantee of being saved, would you take this up? Or reject it as not safe enough? Certainly, we all have a sort of healthy minded notion that the universe would fit exactly as is and would accept this offer, and certainly others may not accept as the lack of safety removes the appeal. Surely, we all have breakdowns in life and would love the position as a ‘prodigal son’ to fall back in the embrace of the absolute of the universe. So, the security of never being born v possibilities never experienced. James argues that those seeking Nirvana, the cessation of life, are merely afraid of life. Thus, the religious monists embrace life as being necessary, one, and well. Now, turning back to the contrast of absolute appeal of the tender minded and the pluralistic appeal of the tough minded; the toughs pluralistic could even just be called moralistic and not religious, but in either use James argues it is hard to not keep some seriousness composed in life and the reality in either, as religious or moralistic, is still decided in our faith rather than logic as we have to enjoy life's adventures, experiences, and the facts that arise. Going back, those that accepted the creators offer do not avoid evil but rather face it as something to be overcome they do this by dropping it altogether and forgetting it from their universal conception. Thus, in becoming a rationalist to a universe to take it seriously is a true pragmatist by living with the undetermined. But what else must they account for? Other people, sure. Other gods? Certainly, they could just be manifestations of the true monotheistic God. So, factors can be sorted into truths. Pragmatically speaking and with the broad use, if the term God works for things, then it is truth. Differences to this are to be dealt with as they arise, continuing the truth process. James argues we as humans are not the greatest experience of reality in the universe and see us on relations with the rest of the universe and its other creatures, of which share many intentions that we interweave with social realities. With the proofs of religious experience discussed here we certainly would agree that to a vast number of creatures of varying intentions and needs there are certainly the realities of higher powers constantly operating within the world. So, one can call pragmatism religious but only as pluralistic or melioristic, but to then accept it is relative to the individual to decide. Our various overhanging beliefs plus our adventures are all that is necessary for proof of facts formed. In one's own adventuring if they are radically tough then nature itself should suffice, if radically tender then a more monistic religious approach would help better than a pluralistic but as many of us often fall in between the two then the pluralistic/moralistic option is pragmatically best. Between crude naturalism and the transcendental absolutism lies the pragmatism, or the meliorism, of religion.

Thoughts: Concerning the Walt Whitman poem; this piece feels conceivably true on a commonsense regard but truly to try a critical view on it would just be an injustice as we clearly know this is not well argued empirically. Thus, we cannot cross commonsense and the empirical and must accept this poem for the commonsense truths that arise. Thus, even just a poem like this is one's own mystical journey. James makes it clear with this, for mysticism, what some points of departure are. The more we recognize the more we can acknowledge and the more mystical our lives can be to our own desire. This is only so much clearer by his argument of actions and wishes. To the poem, it can also be viewed in a mystical lens or also a psychological lens, either work at least as a folk psychology of reputable results. Thus, some may say they have an inner monologue they converse with, and others may call it a soul and partake on a subjective adventure of a reality relative to that present headspace.

-I was a big fan of the conception of supplementing phenomenon and to me it highlighted the possible practical values of religious behavior. Say a person works out for anger, takes walks for fun, and has sex for sexual relief; the first two they could do a variety of other things to arguably meet the same release for either anger or fun, but the physical body is necessary for sexual relief. However, if prayer, for example, could substitute sexual desires truly by the individual standards and in good faith then that is remarkable the practical value in religious behaviors. Truth in sex satisfied in prayer is a true reality as much as the gym satisfies anger for Bob.

-If X is possible, it necessitates realities if a chicken is real there must be eggs, hens, food, etc.; the more we find, the more empirically grounded it is and becomes a fact. I mean, concerning all these lectures James aim has been similar in establishing the reality of pragmatism by pointing out pragmatism’s necessary realities. Surely if we believe in simple categorical conception that also necessitates religious reality. By seeing X number of events hold religious value in people's lived experience they establish the connections to make the possible a continuously adapting fact.

-So, the security of never being born v the possibilities of experiences. I found this a great thought tool; getting older I've really begun to wrestle with the former but without inquiry deeper I was only miserable wrestling with it and I find it essential, if relativity allows, to think it through. In doing so I found both components necessitate each other and are connected. If I think through my full list of thoughts within these systems I find value in the totality of the connection and truth not only in the bad but also the good. I find life better as a light wave than a particle and I cannot look at these great conceptions of life in freeze frame. They must be lived and lived with momentum, it is ok to slow the momentum it is just about the balance.

-I highly agree that within certain spheres of reality we need to ditch the conception of evil in its entirety. A decent example is when viewing animals in nature.

-I also certainly find religion pragmatically valid and James's take on all of this rather life changing, not only for myself but my perceptual lens of the social world that I live in with others.

--Seth Graves-Huffman

A Beginner’s Understanding of The Moral Philosopher and The Moral Life

...and the thoughts it inspired on the meaning of life [1]

by Ed Craig

What is the meaning of life? ….

It feels pretentious to begin an essay with that question. The meaning of life may be the most fundamental philosophical and theological question. It was the subject of concern for Socrates, St. Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, Nietzsche, all those existentialists, Woody Allen, Ricky Gervais, and countless others. What’s it all about, Alfie? It is almost a cliché. The very thought of discussing it brings to mind an image of intellectuals sitting at a table in an outdoor Parisian café, smoking their pipes, drinking wine, and conversing about life’s meaning and purpose, if any. Ah, the philosophic life, the best possible life. Pretentious of not, I am going to take the plunge. William James has something to add to the conversation.

What is the meaning of the moral life is a better way to ask the same question. What is ‘the moral life’ and should I want to live it? Is so, why? Imagine it is 1895, and William James, the American psychologist and philosopher, his brother Henry the author, Albert Camus, James Joyce, and Ernest Hemingway are at their regular table at Les Deux Margot in Paris, enjoying that summer’s refreshing rosé, discussing these questions. They focus on the question of whether there is an objectively true moral order; a proper hierarchy of moral principles. James the philosopher surprises his companions by saying that if there is, it cannot be provided by philosophers and their ethical reasoning. The principles of morality and their order are made by human experience, not by divine command or the product of abstract thinking. Making a moral world is an on-going human project, with no end in sight. We cannot know how it turns out until we no longer have humans experiencing and reacting to life. What a conversation that would be... (continues)

THE MORAL PHILOSOPHER AND THE MORAL LIFE

MPML [compare Pragmatism and Religion, conclusion]

V.

The chief of all the reasons why concrete ethics cannot be final is that they have to wait on metaphysical and theological beliefs. I said some time back that real ethical relations existed in a purely human world. They would exist even in what we called a moral solitude if the thinker had various {211}ideals which took hold of him in turn. His self of one day would make demands on his self of another; and some of the demands might be urgent and tyrannical, while others were gentle and easily put aside. We call the tyrannical demands imperatives. If we ignore these we do not hear the last of it. The good which we have wounded returns to plague us with interminable crops of consequential damages, compunctions, and regrets. Obligation can thus exist inside a single thinker's consciousness; and perfect peace can abide with him only so far as he lives according to some sort of a casuistic scale which keeps his more imperative goods on top. It is the nature of these goods to be cruel to their rivals. Nothing shall avail when weighed in the balance against them. They call out all the mercilessness in our disposition, and do not easily forgive us if we are so soft-hearted as to shrink from sacrifice in their behalf.

The deepest difference, practically, in the moral life of man is the difference between the easy-going and the strenuous mood. When in the easy-going mood the shrinking from present ill is our ruling consideration. The strenuous mood, on the contrary, makes us quite indifferent to present ill, if only the greater ideal be attained. The capacity for the strenuous mood probably lies slumbering in every man, but it has more difficulty in some than in others in waking up. It needs the wilder passions to arouse it, the big fears, loves, and indignations; or else the deeply penetrating appeal of some one of the higher fidelities, like justice, truth, or freedom. Strong relief is a necessity of its vision; and a world where all the mountains are brought down and all the valleys are {212}exalted is no congenial place for its habitation. This is why in a solitary thinker this mood might slumber on forever without waking. His various ideals, known to him to be mere preferences of his own, are too nearly of the same denominational value: he can play fast or loose with them at will. This too is why, in a merely human world without a God, the appeal to our moral energy falls short of its maximal stimulating power. Life, to be sure, is even in such a world a genuinely ethical symphony; but it is played in the compass of a couple of poor octaves, and the infinite scale of values fails to open up. Many of us, indeed,—like Sir James Stephen in those eloquent 'Essays by a Barrister,'—would openly laugh at the very idea of the strenuous mood being awakened in us by those claims of remote posterity which constitute the last appeal of the religion of humanity. We do not love these men of the future keenly enough; and we love them perhaps the less the more we hear of their evolutionized perfection, their high average longevity and education, their freedom from war and crime, their relative immunity from pain and zymotic disease, and all their other negative superiorities. This is all too finite, we say; we see too well the vacuum beyond. It lacks the note of infinitude and mystery, and may all be dealt with in the don't-care mood. No need of agonizing ourselves or making others agonize for these good creatures just at present.

When, however, we believe that a God is there, and that he is one of the claimants, the infinite perspective opens out. The scale of the symphony is incalculably prolonged. The more imperative ideals now begin to speak with an altogether new objectivity and significance, and to utter the penetrating, shattering, {213}tragically challenging note of appeal. They ring out like the call of Victor Hugo's alpine eagle, "qui parle au précipice et que le gouffre entend," and the strenuous mood awakens at the sound. It saith among the trumpets, ha, ha! it smelleth the battle afar off, the thunder of the captains and the shouting. Its blood is up; and cruelty to the lesser claims, so far from being a deterrent element, does but add to the stern joy with which it leaps to answer to the greater. All through history, in the periodical conflicts of puritanism with the don't-care temper, we see the antagonism of the strenuous and genial moods, and the contrast between the ethics of infinite and mysterious obligation from on high, and those of prudence and the satisfaction of merely finite need.

The capacity of the strenuous mood lies so deep down among our natural human possibilities that even if there were no metaphysical or traditional grounds for believing in a God, men would postulate one simply as a pretext for living hard, and getting out of the game of existence its keenest possibilities of zest. Our attitude towards concrete evils is entirely different in a world where we believe there are none but finite demanders, from what it is in one where we joyously face tragedy for an infinite demander's sake. Every sort of energy and endurance, of courage and capacity for handling life's evils, is set free in those who have religious faith. For this reason the strenuous type of character will on the battle-field of human history always outwear the easy-going type, and religion will drive irreligion to the wall.


It would seem, too,—and this is my final conclusion,—that the stable and systematic moral universe {214}for which the ethical philosopher asks is fully possible only in a world where there is a divine thinker with all-enveloping demands. If such a thinker existed, his way of subordinating the demands to one another would be the finally valid casuistic scale; his claims would be the most appealing; his ideal universe would be the most inclusive realizable whole. If he now exist, then actualized in his thought already must be that ethical philosophy which we seek as the pattern which our own must evermore approach.[3] In the interests of our own ideal of systematically unified moral truth, therefore, we, as would-be philosophers, must postulate a divine thinker, and pray for the victory of the religious cause. Meanwhile, exactly what the thought of the infinite thinker may be is hidden from us even were we sure of his existence; so that our postulation of him after all serves only to let loose in us the strenuous mood. But this is what it does in all men, even those who have no interest in philosophy. The ethical philosopher, therefore, whenever he ventures to say which course of action is the best, is on no essentially different level from the common man. "See, I have set before thee this day life and good, and death and evil; therefore, choose life that thou and thy seed may live,"—when this challenge comes to us, it is simply our total character and personal genius that are on trial; and if we invoke any so-called philosophy, our choice and use of that also are but revelations of our personal aptitude or incapacity for moral life. From this unsparing practical ordeal no professor's lectures and no array of books {215}can save us. The solving word, for the learned and the unlearned man alike, lies in the last resort in the dumb willingnesses and unwillingnesses of their interior characters, and nowhere else. It is not in heaven, neither is it beyond the sea; but the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it.

[1] An Address to the Yale Philosophical Club, published in the International Journal of Ethics, April, 1891.

[2] The Principles of Psychology, New York, H. Holt & Co, 1890.

[3] All this is set forth with great freshness and force in the work of my colleague, Professor Josiah Royce: "The Religious Aspect of Philosophy." Boston, 1885.

"my religious act"

...April 13th. I had to stop yesterday.... Six months ago, I shouldn't have thought it possible that a life deliberately founded on pottering about and dawdling through the day would be endurable or even possible. I have attained such skill that I doubt if my days ever at any time seemed to glide by so fast. But it corrodes one's soul nevertheless. I scribble a little in bed every morning, and have reached page 48 of my third Gifford lecture—though Lecture II, alas! must be rewritten entirely. The conditions don't conduce to an energetic grip of the subject, and I am afraid that what I write is pretty slack and not what it would be if my vital tone were different. The problem I have set myself is a hard one: first, to defend (against all the prejudices of my "class") "experience" against "philosophy" as being the real backbone of the world's religious life—I mean prayer, guidance, and all that sort of thing immediately and privately felt, as against high and noble general views of our destiny and the world's meaning; and second, to make the hearer or reader believe, what I myself invincibly do believe, that, although all the special manifestations of religion may have been absurd (I mean its creeds and theories), yet the life of it as a whole is mankind's most important function. A task well-nigh impossible, I fear, and in which I shall fail; but to attempt it is my religious act...

William James, To Miss Frances R. Morse. Apr 12 1900

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/38091/38091-h/38091-h.htm

Pragmatism VII

Pragmatism Lecture 7-Pragmatism and Humanism

Humans commonly aim to see truth as a single conception. James now wants to address truth as less of an inquiry and more as an abstract concept summarizing the plural truths in the world. People use language tools every day to insinuate truths as existing greater than their actual boundaries, an example being how people personify weather. We think we are always uncovering new truths but rather it seems rights, wrongs, and truths are added as history continues, thus making language and law man made. James next aims to model his position in relation to Schiller in that he believes pragmatism is better off as a humanism since truths are man made and it also seems impossible imagining a world prior to humans. So, we must treat it as a composition and thus plastic, and in doing so we must aim to test its boundaries. James aims to defend this humanist position. In this regard we should view truths as beliefs about an independent reality and regard reality as being that which truth must account for because of the next several reasons. One, we have the flux of our sensations constantly occurring without our choice, its not that they are true or false but rather ‘just are’. Two, reality is what truth must account for as we see relations exchanged between senses or copies in the mind, either mutable like dates or also fixed and essential in reality. Third, we cannot forget the prior truths existing that past inquiries must account for. These three are always participating in belief formation but in concerning these, we only have so much human freedom. Sensations are beyond control, but we can take mental notes relative to our own interests. Reality is as it is, but we take it in X way relative to our perspective thus, senses tell us nothing of truth in itself rather it is us that speaks truth as we do. This concerns our eternal truths as well; new experiences adjust and rearrange intrinsic beliefs, and this continues until nearly all ones beliefs are man-made. Our first two facts, the random flux of senses and the relations exchanged between minds from senses and copies in minds, both show a reality rather free of man-made influence but must then be humanized, compacted and adjusted, to the human mass. Concerning reality independent of humans, James finds this worse as an inquiry and better as a mental reference point. Concerning our beliefs about reality it is near impossible to separate our human relations. Is a chessboard black with white squares or vice versa? Neither is more true or false than the other. What about differing constellation names? No name for them is truer than another rather, they are human made factors that reality agrees with. Even the concept ‘thing’ is used to sort realities into trues and falses; it’s a humanistic principle when you can see human practicalities. Now, as we grow surely our flux of senses will calm but is there a greater or lesser degree of value? Well maybe it is not that we absorb the truths of reality but rather, we add descriptions to reality and thus altering its truth conception. Now, to contrast, rationalists see reality as ready made and complete, while pragmatists see it as a process in the making and heading towards completion. An alternative to these two would have to concern the structure of the universe. With rationalists seeing it as complete and pragmatism seeing it as becoming, we are back to a monism v pluralism. In wrestling with these two temperaments, we need something to anchor the finite, as behind every fact we trust the causation to hold consistent, this ideal is a factor that solidifies the universe, our anchor. An anchor is a common abstraction to divide the tough and tenderminded as well. For the tough, there is no real anchor, and the rationalists are merely using words as an anchor. However, we do see both use it as a summarizing tool of totality but it is just bizarre how differently people can take something as being abstract or concrete. Should pragmatism make use of this eternal view of the background conception that anchors the finite? Surely, we do still use the word winter despite some warm nights; it’s a good abstraction tool that we use for a vast number of human realities. For absolutists that take the world as complete, they are met with a deterministic reality and end up taking its truths as concrete rather than abstract. Either way appropriately would be pragmatic as they both show pragmatic value aimed at readjusting their personal agreement with reality. Taking the world that was prior to humans as being either abstract or concrete, that has any value to life, shows its meaning and thus some truth about it. Even the absolutists ideal of the eternally real has meaning, as James will address in the next lecture.

Thoughts- I am sure we all have a tendency to want to trust in pragmatism as a humanism, but James does show it has many criticisms and, thankfully, is here to help defend pragmatism. I understood the lecture fairly well but not so much the critics in it directly and would enjoy chatting about that. This piece also makes it seem essential in accepting the world as it is and as we are (limited humans) and then how we navigate with that. By this the influence of human realities and also the humanistic factors of pragmatic truths seem logically inescapable thus, hard to imagine a non-humanistic reality from James’s take. So, in making his point it felt a bit over-reductionist, but I do understand it to be in reaction to critics so in general that is why I would enjoy chatting about it.

    --Seth Graves-Huffman

Pragmatism V-VI

William James Lectures 5-6

Lecture 5-Pragmatism and Common sense

In learning from the last lecture that pragmatism tends towards plural direction we can again agree it certainly is at least by simple additive function; things being joined if only by the concept ‘and’. This is tough for the monists as they must then assume gain/loss to the eternal. Now, turning towards the concept of knowledge, James argues that it begins in locations of varying degree and can grow and spread. With pragmatism, knowledge grows gradually and often in the restricting of opinions. If a person were to break routine, stand up and yell it would cause you to pragmatically restructure your opinion of them. In this the mind becomes strained between old belief and the new fruits of experience. Thus, minds grow in areas and spread; however, ideally as little as possible as not to alter old knowledge too much. So, we fight the spread of mind’s new knowledge upon us, patch it up after and move forward with the newly settled knowledge. Now in addressing the main topic at hand of common sense, James wants to consider it as a continuum connecting us to ancient ancestors concerning crucial methods of thinking preserved throughout history. Common sense can be viewed in several ways, practically wise it is a person’s good judgement. Philosophically wise it is a bit more technical as being, a type of intellectual thought. Concerning common sense, an age-old method, particularly by rationalists, has always concerned conceptuals like, thing, same/different, minds, bodies, one time, one space. Context like this made it difficult to see the ancestors working to separate realities from experiences as they did not see a need too. But newer truths give us words like ‘thoughts’ thus neutralizing thoughts as realities and instead reclassifying them. Surely it feels like common sense for us to view time as a single straight line but with regards to science we know that time is inconsistent. But, practically speaking we know this inconsistency is not a good representation of human experience and also such cosmic maps would be read with imaginary conceptuals and numbers themselves. But certainly, we saw the benefits from the imaginary conceptuals like ‘kinds’ or ‘sameness’ has with the conception of ‘the many’ we certainly would not want to discard such powerful concepts either, pragmatically we must hover in the in between. In everyday life common sense persists and is hard to deny even if just simply the concept of self or body. Rationalists enjoy common sense but use it far too technical in man’s relation to the divine; pragmatically speaking, it is in a person’s intellect the words meaning and its influential function. Science and philosophy also press the boundaries of common sense; concerning scientific realism, objects secondary qualities seem to become unreal and concerning critical philosophy, there is no common sense in being, its just a trick of the mind. However, again we see that critical thought in science has given us practical tools, clocks, medicine, telephones, all coming from the results of external circumstances. This is our newer practical control over nature which common sense certainly utilizes. Science is expanding too rapidly for the average public common sense to keep up. Critical philosophy is useful, but it has little pragmatic value. Thus, we have three highly comparable forms of thought of the world, common sense, scientific, and critical philosophy. If common sense were the most true then why would science also regard their qualities as secondaries while it also itself even uses the imaginary world of lines and curves? All three conceptions of truth are better for spheres of life. In concluding this, common sense as truth assumes the copying by the mind of a given reality. And by this James will argue, the conflict of truth between these three is why we should reevaluate our notion of truth.

Lecture 6-Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth

To start, James wants to address truth as meaning: agreement with reality, since a true idea must copy its reality. Our mental conceptions of the physical do copy; take a clock on the wall, visualize it and you have a mental copy. But, concerning its internal mechanics, it is not too accurate. So, if it is not exact but we trusted our conception beforehand, what does that say about our agreements with objects? To idealists? Well, what is true is realized by divine revelation thus, mental frameworks like mental copying appear as being from the divine. To pragmatists? If it is true, it is verifiable, if it is false, it is not, this is the practical difference in ideas. Truth would not be inherent; it happens to an idea being made true by events and then verified. Verification and validation are practical at signifying the practical consequences, a great example being the agreement formula which concerns whether our ideas and their consequences agree with reality. Agreements insinuate realities that help conduct our actions and ideas, this is the function of ‘agreeable leading’ or the idea’s verification. Concerning pragmatism, thoughts that are true thoughts are valuable by actions, true not as ends but as means to more crucial ends. An example such as seeing animals may signify the true fact that something was there, but the tracks may be more crucial for signaling food in times of starvation. A pragmatic value of truth comes at the right times as needed, thus also the importance of latent truths. When a stored truth ever becomes practical it resurfaces, its need satisfies the verification, passes over it, and we call it a truth. Our thoughts and beliefs commonly pass over as well as long as not challenged as that would push for a direct verification and thus reassessment. Generally, people assume things exist as kinds, we see one causation and assume it over. People then become conditioned to the life behavior that repeats for us correctly a good 99% of the time but without ever truly verifying, as the results do not press for it. Thus, partial verification is confirmed in a commonsense regard as verification does not only concern the external but also the internal of mental ideas. Examples like 2+2=4 or that gray is between black and white; these feel of common sense, and we do not seek an external verification. Now, in concerning truth as guiding, or leading, we hold our eternal or deep personal truths to heart and we use the external reality to write facts best fit, the marriage of fact and theory. This ‘leading’ is the essential nature as it determines its ‘fit-ness’ in the world. The persuasiveness of leading commonly passes as an indirect verification for the experience but when one concerns it as true it always comes back to external verification. This is a rough pragmatic take on agreement. James now points towards truth-processes such as health or wealth. Truth is made just as health is experienced; health is lived in things like digestion or sleep. We commonly pass over the verification as we trust the ideas of the past has worked well for much of common sense. Thus, we can see we have a massive amount of indirectly verified ideas that work better as such, say I have not been but someone else told me that Japan was a real place. Looking at Aristotle, we see his distinction between habit and act; health in action is seen as good sleep or digestion but, a healthy person cannot always do these but rather only when necessary. Thus, they become habits, truth as well also becomes a habit of belief and ideas. Concerning the absolute truth, nothing can alter it; this is hard as most past truths were discarded when new ones arose thus, they were only relative truths. When new truths are found they feel as if they have always existed as true. Now, with the future mass influx of verification that’s inevitable experience’s partial truth’s must address an almost absolute truth as to address the totality of their beliefs. People invest in beliefs as a means of value and when applied to life it becomes action in reality, readjusting our beliefs. Concerning the rationalist’s absolute, truth has nothing to do with the practical and our agreements are only relative. But the pragmatic would argue that just like truth-processes like health or wealth that truth is conditionally relative. Truth is as necessary as un-true even if just in verification but, un-truths are not real things thus it would be a relative truth and not an absolute. It is general conditions and consequences that limit our abstract imperatives thus truth is relative and must be treated pragmatically or, in agreement with the reality that we see truth lies in the concrete and experiential.

My thoughts: Common sense has a strong pragmatic value and creating the conceptual helps to separate and not confuse common sense and critical understanding in daily life. I would enjoy talking through some different common sense utilitarian possibilities, one that I think about; does it give us more pragmatic value to hold a commonsense regard for the afterlife? The being, we just do not know. Even empirically we do not know what happens truly after death, thus the conversation becomes idle and needs practical settlement. And suddenly the commonsense reality of ‘I don’t know’ to an afterlife feels to hold more real-world cash-value. Also, truth as agreement is really compelling for pragmatic purpose. However, I did have some difficulties understanding his rationalist’s arguments against agreement.

--Seth Graves-Huffman

Ken Burns: Being an American means...

Proud, but also aspirational...

https://www.instagram.com/p/Cw-UHcQtkpM/?utm_source=ig_web_button_share_sheet&igshid=ZGUzMzM3NWJiOQ==

Pragmatism III-IV

 Posted for Seth Graves-Huffman

William James Pragmatism Lectures 3 and 4

Lecture 3-Some Metaphysical Problems Pragmatically Considered

James addressed that we should analyze pragmatism with some older metaphysical disputes. Starting out, we have the classic substance problem. A substance is a thing that is composed of a multitude of attributes, a substance example being lead. Things like lead and chalk may have many similar attributes but are entirely different, either way it is still matter. These phenomena would come in groups such as the lead group, chalk group, etc., and our thoughts and feelings would be a little different, as James says, a part of our spirit substance. A substance’s attributes are its pragmatic cash in value. Now, concerning the defining of the word substance academia has had an issue of being too technical. These substances can be referred to as phenomenon as we cannot access their core reality. Now, looking at the ‘substance’ involved in the Eucharist one can exude their own subjective influence on the core reality truly unknowable to us and feel a change in receiving the bread and wine, now as the body and blood of Christ. Suspend the causal search and the pragmatic cash value is high in sensations. A pragmatic cash value only concerns sensations and the subjective. Now, looking at the dispute of materialism as opposed to theism or spiritualism in a world that is created as is and without interference. Materialism is solely concerned with nature and facts, spiritualism however, is concerned with nature, facts, and the individuals personal influence within. However, the dispute between there two is merely aesthetic preference. Many see science as gross, and many see religion as noble and then there is people that see these two as completely opposite. James would say that is because they both merely point at the same reality. So, which is more practical? Well with neither option can you get any contingent expectations thus it would be an idle dispute. A wise man walks away. So, what is the alternative in this scenario of materialism or spirit? A practical one. However, if both are the same the difference between the two would better be referred to as a universal subjective. All the while, a materialist’s universal future is a bleak one of expansion and shutting down. We all have near mystical moments every day, but generally they leave us with nothing whatsoever. Versus the spiritual pragmatic that believes God preserves a moral order and truly we as people do all have personal moral orders. With this spiritualism deals with the world of promises but the materialist deals with, as James says, ‘disappointment’. God ensures a saving future. Next, we have the design problem. God has always been debated in the external world; God made a bird its beak in his design for it to reach. However, concerning Darwin, the beak formed as it was fit by nature’s design. This put a large struggle in the path of theism, but through the human spirit, accommodation was able to fit the two pragmatically; God created the world as is and left it to become as needed. But concerning the pragmatic method, there is no consequential difference thus the dispute is idle. However, the theist does retain a strong cash value of future promise. Lastly, the free-will problem. A theist would pragmatically rationalize that they are better off not questioning free-will. A determinist would argue we are because of what happened before, but this is personally diminishing thus lacking pragmatism. Dignity has much to do with freedom. As determinists insinuate people as accountable for what they did not choose, its runs difficult pragmatically as we should be individuals not concepts. James argues that pragmatism needs to rejoin free-will with determinism.

Lecture 4-The One and the Many

Philosophy has a history concerning unity, or better defined as totality. People tend to highly regard unity over variety, a unity as a great fact with many interlocked parts whether by abstract monism or by or scientific conceptual. Concerning oneness, if we are to grant the concept existence, what is gained versus lost? James offered eight different routes. One, the world as a discourse is conceptualized as a singularity for discussion’s sake. Two, is this oneness continuous? Do the one and the many connect? Surely parts of dust are held together, but merely by space and time as a connecting medium. Three, there would be an innumerable paths of continued connection; you can trace the lines of influence far back, for example gravity or light or even conceptual abstractions and their influence. These may arise and become mental roadblocks that force us to reassess, this would be a loss in continuity. Four, the problem of causal unity; past minor causes necessitate the consideration of an original cause or the absolute. But with pragmatism, we concern the relative of theism and be it the absolute or the atom there has always been a plural notion of the many. Five, generic unity; there are many species in each kind and a kind implies the same for all within the grouping. Surely logic predicates things the same but no two things can be exactly identical making it hard to predict repeat futures. Six, the unity of purpose; the world as one meaning means that a vast number of factors come to serve common purposes. An example would even include man made systems such as banks or postal. The purpose can be many things, money, happiness, etc. but when we do set out purpose, things do happen and alter. As a species, our purposes do clash for compromise, showing our shared human teleological needs. Seven, aesthetic union, this is very similar to a teleological union. Narratives are aesthetic and help hold things together in a conceptual unity. Finally, eight, concerning accepting oneness, the great monistic thinking medium. The notion concerns the concept of the one knower, for them the many exists but only as objective thought with the purpose of a unity of mental states, thus knowing the one. Their concern for knowing consists in the arrival to the oneness. But what of the absolute one, the all-knower? For the rationalists, God’s consciousness comes as that of an individual conscious experience. The empiricists? What we know is because someone before us knew something. By this the world is a universal noetic as it is joined by the knowledge of others. Thus, in readdressing the technical defining issue with substance we see it is now as something conceptual and of pragmatic value. So, in the end, what is the practical difference between the one and the many? Turning to the one-knower, a unity of the world is the pragmatic value. And versus the absolute-knower? James uses a mystical follower example concerning their disbelief in the one and the many, neither exists as all is one and not separate. For them they gain a pragmatic value of a trust in the future with a lack of fear of purpose. Pragmatism aims at a moderate temperament between monism and pluralism in order to get at the practical. However, absolute unity in not sided with the fact loving of pragmatism thus to be pragmatic it must start as pluralistic. But, by pragmatic principle it is good to be pluralistic one day and monistic another day, it just all comes down to the conceivable point of view of that day’s subjective.

My analysis: These readings showed a vast number of pragmatic benefits involved within the religious sphere. The list was so vast and also negative to the empirical, such as science’s future of disappointment. It makes me want to consider James’s bias, why it became so intense, and if the intensity is a bit too influentially bias. The reading was hard to get past many of his explanations in empirical regards. They were all highly logical exactly as they need to be, and also fit withing a pragmatic method, however he does seem to go quick over many empirical concerns. Also, connecting the one as an abstract connection with totality was very enlightening in a pragmatic regard. James feels like he is able to give me the connection between the secular and religious spheres

Comments on Pragmatism I-II

 Posted for Seth Graves-Huffman

Pragmatism Lectures 1 and 2

William James' Pragmatism lectures are an excellent segway into religion's practical purpose in human lives and in the field of philosophical pragmatism. In his first lecture, James argues the history of philosophy arose from human discourse concerning individual human temperaments. Most of us may be flexible but James pushes that we should use strong philosophical temperaments, in learning our own. The primary temperaments he mentions are those of rationalist, or as he calls tender minded thinkers, and empiricists, the tough minded. Tendered minded define as generally religious, free willing, and dogmatic while tough minded defines as generally pessimistic, pluralistic, and skeptical. James argues we are in an empirical boom where people are very scientific in thought and religion is neutralizing and in such an age humans role of importance has diminished. Generally it has been in the tendered minded and religious nature to be active concerning the conception of life however todays empirical has created a strong human passivity. As for James it is human spirituality that endures adaption and accommodation. His aim? Combine this with the scientific loyalty to facts. James also mentions a main aim for philosophy is refinement, but is refinement truly a part of the crude world? Surely not, thus philosophy obsessed with refinement is not truly empirical. This is an example of the satisfaction of rational minds in unreal systems. The universe is not closed and thus cannot be answered with closed concepts. James argues in his contemporary that people are becoming pragmatic in reality and philosophy should as well. James argues it is hard to hate on rational escapism as, as reality is not the conceptual, but, are all theories not escapism? He does argue that philosophy is excluded as its intent is against escapism of reality. However, if philosophy can abstract universal principles than it must also accept the abstraction of philosophy. The universal system of the absolute shows how unique people actually are and we should praise such individual temperaments. 

Lecture 2, What Pragmatism Means, starts out with an example. A person is chasing a squirrel around the tree but the squirrel goes so fast he does not see it. Does he go round the squirrel? James says yes and no, just depending on how you define it. Concerning the earth? The person goes north to east to south to west, thus passing the squirrel. Or relatively speaking from his vision, he never passes the squirrel. Both are true, but how do we pick which one? James refers to the Pragmatic Method, or that we should interpret by tracing consequences. If there is no practical difference he calls it an idle dispute. For a dispute to be serious it must show a practical difference. Any positive significance found is pragmatic. Say, how could the world be different if X or Y were true? If I can find no practical difference than the alternative is senseless. Here James argues, the point of philosophy ought to be what makes a distinct difference in our lives and experiences if we hold a certain cosmology as true. For many they do this merely with words be it either magical or secular, words such as God, matter, even energy. When you have any of these one can 'rest' conceptually and not worry. Theories look less like answers and more like tools. Pragmatism is multiversitile, it interconnects people reading atheisms, religious followers praying, meta practitioners, and even scientific doctors. By this James refers to pragmatism as moreso an attitude of orientation. Our ancient ancestors of course preformed empirical tests but they deciphered them as the work of the divine. They did this because these things worked for them if only being vague approximations. However, one could argue all of our scientific findings today are merely approximations. The point is that if from a particular point of view it proves useful, than it is pragmatic. Truth in our ideas means their power to work. Next James talks about 'new opinions' and that these come from a troubled mind in a strange mental place. The persons aim? Escape this by modifying past opinions. In this, James regards pragmatism as a 'genetic theory' linking new facts to past opinions. Much of rationalism developed for pragmatic means and pragmatism does not object to abstractions as long as it minds reality and takes you somewhere. For many this is simply comfort. In trusting the infinite divine one can forgo moral responsibilities in what James calls a 'moral vacation'.

I found this reading highly comforting in itself. James makes it very persuasive to understand the divine in a secular lens. I found a large fascination through my own curiosity of individual subjective experience in my secular context versus the experience of a devout religious follower. However, James makes it rather simple that one can be devout in science as well. His conception of religious pragmatism is so encaptivating that almost everything seems religious. Or rather, maybe he is showing us that its not about the words and conception being correct but rather a persons belief in the causation. As we do that with science many others do that with religion. However, the point is about individuals having an adequate and appreciated subjective. Just like James says, if it satisfies my individual appreciation than it is pragmatic and this may personally help me to analyze areas I do not find actual appreciation in my own personal beliefs and to consider pragmatically changing them. This connects well with his conception of 'moral holidays', and that's a rather strong concept to envy. By James, maybe I should not envy it but allow my mind in a strange place and find my own temperament of the same world we all live in. Concerning James, can we truly take moral holidays in a secular cosmology? Was James able to practice his own prescriptive pragmatism? Should we truly seek less moderate temperaments? These are concerns still sitting with me.

--Seth Graves-Huffman

Concern for the health of American democracy

Today, at the initiative of the George W. Bush Institute, U.S. presidential foundations and centers for thirteen presidents since Herbert Hoover released a statement expressing concern about the health of American democracy. The statement notes that while the diverse population of the United States means we have a range of backgrounds and beliefs, "democracy holds us together. We are a country rooted in the rule of law, where the protection of the rights of all people is paramount."

"Americans have a strong interest in supporting democratic movements and respect for human rights around the world because free societies elsewhere contribute to our own security and prosperity here at home," the statement reads. "But that interest is undermined when others see our own house in disarray." Without mentioning names, it called on elected officials to restore trust in public service by governing effectively "in ways that deliver for the American people." "The rest of us must engage in civil dialogue," it said, "respect democratic institutions and rights; uphold safe, secure, and accessible elections; and contribute to local, state, or national improvement."

Traditionally, ex-presidents do not comment on politics, and this extraordinary effort is the first time presidential centers have commented on them. Because this step is unprecedented the Eisenhower Foundation chose not to sign, although it commended the defense of democracy. But the centers for Hoover, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Baines Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama all did.

That the executive director of the George W. Bush Institute felt obliged to take a step that is a veiled critique of today's Republican Party—Bush's party—is a sign of how deep concern over our democracy runs. David Kramer, the Bush Institute's executive director, said the statement was intended to remind Americans that democracy cannot be taken for granted and to send "a positive message reminding us of who we are and also reminding us that when we are in disarray, when we're at loggerheads, people overseas are also looking at us and wondering what's going on."

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https://open.substack.com/pub/heathercoxrichardson/p/september-7-2023?r=35ogp&utm_medium=ios&utm_campaign=post