The Varieties of Religious Experience Lectures 3, and 4 & 5 (Part 1)

 

The Varieties of Religious Experience Lectures 3, and 4 & 5 (Part 1)

Lecture 3- The Reality of the Unseen

The human relation with objects adopts many attitudes including moral, practical, or even religious. We are most commonly aware of these relations by our senses but also by our mere thoughts and oddly, many times these thoughts may have a stronger effect on us and our attitudes than the former objective sensations. If someone insulted me, I may be more upset about it the next day in memory then when I was in the moment that it occurred in. For most western religions, especially Christianity, visions are rather rare thus most followers, institutional ones, generally base religious ideas within the practical present. Certainly, religion has concrete objects but it feels more full of abstract objects; God's attributes such as justice, holiness, mercy, etc. (p54). All of which greatly influence pragmatic practicalities such as meditation. In a reassessment to abstract objects James offers a Kantian approach, objects of belief in God, such as design, soul, freedom, are not exactly objects of knowledge at all (p54-55) as they do not concern sense, thus there is no significance in discussing. But, James defends, there is certainly meaning in our practices; we can act as if there were a God, feel as if one were free, consider plans for immortality (p55), as these words make a significant practical difference in lives. With Kant, just an idea of what these objects ‘might be’ gives positive reason to conceive it. For James, Kant is another outer limit of religions exaggerations, or sentiments of reality; these sentiments attach to personal objects of belief that can be a lasting mark for the rest of one's life. Abstractions enliven human’s realities and actions and as such we treat them as objects and permit worldly space and realities for them. As we saw prior, this can also be a less religious and more moralist, Emersonian, take, with a universe of concrete objects swimming in the higher universe of abstract ideas. Now James offers a particular take of an author on Greek gods as being only “half-metaphoric personifications” (p58) of abstract laws that separate nature, ie., feeling the smile of the sun, the bite of winter, and so on - with these Greeks offers us at least reference to a human sphere of subjectivity. With this, the Greek pantheon at least argues human beings a sense of feeling, one deeper and more special than most experienced from our normal sensations. If we take this as so, maybe we can awaken this by exciting our normal senses, thus by Kant, if something else equally excites our senses it would appear real. And, if religious concepts do touch this deep subjective, they will certainly be believed in in spite of criticism, and this is interestingly true with visions and hallucinations. Generally, these are relative and imperfect events and often particular realities and sensations occur of which can be as unique as the feeling of a presence not there. The majority of this lecture James gives personal testimonials, religious and not, that are relative to the discussion. These realities almost give chills on their events and the genuinity of the individuals. Starting with a non-religious individual, an academic actually, in a hotel out of town they feel an odd presence about, turning into a difficult psychological situation. Later they meet similar means but with a complete bliss of joy with a will to believe such a beautiful reality that they experienced is more real than anything else they have ever known. Not religious, but it certainly could be. He then gives several more examples of people experiencing ‘odd presences’ that some interpret is God, some spiritual; another example of a blind person, without any ability to distinguish lights or colors, sees a vision of a bearded man in a suit slipped under his door (p62). As if an abstract conception exuded feelings of space and reality, an idea living within reality. Thus at least arguing a human reality with mental function to sense presence, a sense deeper than our usual ones. James continues examples, not only positive conceptions of presence but also negative; an individual reflects on life and they are more ready to take it as it is not and this reality must be a dream, James argues this finds a correlation with suicide, but that is for later discussion. Now it is becoming clear that with a religious temperament people may “possess objects of belief as a quasi-reality directly apprehended” (p64) and often one sense of presences’ apprehended fluctuates so thus too does one's use(s) positively and negatively. One example of a negative use was from a person reminiscing of a past in which they related with the universe as an ‘It’ and without ‘It’ now they feel void and know what is not there. Another example, with the person feeling all around them the limits of what they cannot feel thus feeling the two realities meet, feeling unity with a negative presence. They said to be more willing to doubt themselves than with the presence felt. All examples thus far have certainly shown how vast the range of the human ontological imagination is, unpicturable beings with an intensity near hallucination and at many times with personified relations, commonly as lovers in a cosmic relation. And experiences for people generally bring an overwhelming convincingness thus it is fair to say that of all the examples thus far, as fallible as they may be, are at least genuine perception of truth attempting to be shared. The most common way to oppose such mysticism in philosophy is by using rationalism, as rationalism emphasizes ‘beliefs ought to be able to be articulated’. Thus, James argues four necessities for the grounds of rationalism: one, definite stable abstract principles, two, definite facts of sensations, three, definite hypothesis based on such facts, and four, definite inferences logically drawn (p73). Things that are too vague to define do not belong in a rational system, with philosophy and science being a resultant of rational realities. But, surely at some extent we see the superficiality relative within it, the part constantly challenging for proofs and logic chopping (p73). Rationalism in general has a hard time converting another's perspective if the individual’s ‘intuitions’ are opposed to rationalism's points. Certainly one's consciousness is its totality including subconscious, desires, impulses, etc., thus compromising much of a beings ‘innate’ reality and the attitudes reacting to conflicting rationalism. This rational inferiority is clear when arguing for or against religion, referring back to Kant, it should not be rationally argued. Within metaphysics and religion both articulate reasons but these rationalisms have come only once our unarticulated feelings have made their impression upon us with a general point made (p74). Then intuition can work with reason, growing together. Thus, how religious systems grow, age, and change with time. James's aim here was in no way to claim the subconscious as superior rather, he is just laying out realities. However, certainly with what we have seen “so much for our sense of reality with religious objects” (p75). Now, as we saw, many factors necessitate their opposites, as to not take a life too serious one must be able to understand it first as serious. Thus, the evenly tempered solemn religious follower takes their peace carefully as they still walk with danger in mind and the fact that not all can be held in check, “lie low rather, lie low; for you were in the hands of a living God” (p76). Next, we get a great example with an author’s take on the Book of Job; for them, the real problem with people’s general conclusions is that people take it too serious rather than reflecting solemnities attachment of ‘to not take life too serious’ to then be able to analyze what is apparent to them. That, life is a burden for man and that man is not a pure reflection of creation but rather sees it where he applies himself. It is that man must apply choice as “it is transcendent everywhere” (p76). It is even tempting to call such authors takes as religious, as Professor Seeley argues, “any habitual or regulated admiration is worthy of being called religion” (p77), even such as music, math, and ‘civilizations’, as much as they are admired and believed in.

Lectures 4 and 5- The Religion of Healthy-Mindedness (Part 1 p78-90)

To ask someone ‘what is the primary concern in life?’ We commonly hear answers concerning happiness. Truly the value of happiness polarizes around the lives and morals of humans daily. And it is certainly fair to say if happiness produces such admiration it can nearly be warranted a religion. Regardless, we should keep looking into religion specifically as if the two can be somewhat synonymous and if so then the more complexity in religion the greater the possible depths to human happiness. Often people seek the more complex when the gift of life slows its satisfaction. Concerning life's chief value of happiness, with religion generally happiness will satisfy the individual enough to work as proof, typically within immediate inferences and experiences. James shares an individual’s testimony concerning their close presence with God and the feelings of happiness they experienced were near impossible to articulate their overwhelming value. With this they believe such relations and feelings to be the “most indispensable proof of God's reality” (p79). To them nothing else is nearly as convincing. Now James aims to go to more simple religious examples. For many happiness is immediately particular thus it is rather transient such as causing emotions which may later evolve into forms of “enthusiasm and freedom” (p79). We are not only concerning a hedonistic reality of happiness but also of those that positively refuse any unhappiness ever present to the individual. Within the complete depths of human history there's always been groups of people with the aim of avoiding anything bad in life by accepting all that is natural. James gives a great example of Saint Augustine, “if you but love (God), you may do so as you incline” (p80), with James arguing this as one of the most morally profound observations to those that can grasp its meaning (p80). It is an example of a definite religious attitude, with evil to be overcome it exudes optimism. James then introduces Newman’s ‘once-borns’ and ‘twice-borns’ with once-borns put into a world of happiness and a contentment with it as they “no more shrink from God, then a child from an emperor, before whom the parents tremble” (p81). To them, God's character is harmonious with nature and present in its kindness and beauty. They certainly have very little concern with sin affecting them. And oddly this certainly relates with ancients of whom in “classics you find no consciousness of sin” (p81). They we were certainly conscious of vices but not as being an offence to God rather than themselves. Also, ancients did not often complain about evil rather than accept it, but some people do not learn evil to exist at all. With an example of a Unitarian preacher, we have someone arguing the importance of raising children in a simple and rational religious household, and that nothing could be better. If so, they may never know religious struggles and when met with future endeavors they are ready to use God's infinite strength in any difficulty. Thus, the child has a much greater chance at making it than twice-born, where the world is wrath and good is impossible (p83). Certainly, first-born’s feel to exude an almost pathological happiness compared to twice-borns great embrace of despair. Next, we get a testimonial of a disciple of Walt Whitman and the kind of person he actually was. Whitman had such an intense appreciation for anything natural and oddly, seemed to appreciate and love all people the same. They never heard Whitman complain about anything or anyone, almost as if he did not possess the ability to. It was also hard to tell if he truly feared. Walt Whitman’s literature success certainly has some relation to his cool temperaments, and he works through us, the reader, as a meliorist. While not directly religious Walt Whitman held strong life convictions and certainly understood and recognized sin but possessed such confident composure to write in spite of sin. Whitman refuses to adopt any conception of a sad mortality, and as we speak of removing unhappiness from happiness we can turn back again to the ancients, Greeks and Romans, in their consistency in keeping happiness and sorrow directly separate. For many ancients good was good and bad was bad and they did not deny the despairs of nature with no aim to escape from this world to a better one, possibly through imagination. To Walt Whitman, however, good was perfect and bad was perfect, Whitman disposes the reader to optimism and by that regard James respects him within a “genuine lineage of the prophets” (p87). Now it is looking possible to narrow a definition for ‘healthy-mindedness’: “the tendency which looks on all things and sees that they are good” (p87), with an ability to differentiate between voluntary and non-voluntary healthy-mindedness. Involuntary would be immediate happiness, voluntary or systemic as using an abstraction of conceiving a ‘good’. In this, one must pick several attributes as the essences for the short time being thus disregarding all other aspects. So, a volunteer systemic healthy-mindedness puts good as the primary importance and meaning to life and deliberately excludes evil from any perspective. Now, with happiness being an emotional state it certainly has criticisms and blindness especially concerning conflicting facts. Within happiness evil cannot exist, as to be actively happy they do not have time for it. Thus, explaining the odd behaviors of some as they put in maximum effort to ignore evil. This act of their continued silencing is near religious in nature. Concerning evil, it has a lot to do with an inner temperament, such as a fight or flight. But, to turn away from evil, the facts may remain, but the evil character no longer exists (p89). Now, in adopting optimism and turning back to philosophy, unhappiness begins to have an ugly nature. Attempting to restrict it may cause more problems and considering it bad only causes more evil to exist in situations thus, obviously we ought to reduce this. However, James argues when looking at ‘the bad’ philosophically speaking, it is easy to see the sublime of the reverse side of ‘good’. But this only brings evil back into sight thus to combat this one needs a true systemic conception of optimism for such moments that arise, similar to Walt Whitman with a frame entirely of good. With examples like a patriot, a lover, or a devote, all certainly have significant different conceptions of what evil is or is not thus, too many a sense of victory in the gravestone. In these states goods and bads are consumed within a “higher denomination, an omnipotent which engulfs the evil and which the human being welcomes as the crowning experience of his life” (p90). In the beginning we saw a primary concern in human lives is happiness and we can now see that a systemic healthy-mindedness religious attitude certainly lines up with those life concerns. As we commonly know we do not pay attention to disease death etc., as much as we can generally help it. With that we see the world of poetry or literature looks much more desirable than that of the real world.

--Seth Graves-Huffman